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The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:   
Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated 
 
 by  John C. Coffee, Jr. 
  Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law 





 Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted 
after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and 
“bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at 
both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. This article presents a rival 
perspective. Investors, it argues, are naturally dispersed and poorly organized and so 
constitute a classic “latent group” (in Mancur Olson’s terminology). Such latent groups 
tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive and better funded special interest 
groups in the competition to shape legislation and influence regulatory policy. This 
domination is interrupted, however, by major crises, which encourage “political 
entrepreneurs” to bear the transaction costs of organizing latent interest groups to take 
effective action. But such republican triumphs prove temporary, because, after the crisis 
subsides, the hegemony of the better organized interest groups is restored. 
 
 As a result, a persistent cycle that this article calls the “Regulatory Sine Curve” 
can be observed:  the legislative success of the latent investor group is followed by 
increasingly equivocal implementation of the new legislation, tepid enforcement, and 
eventual legislative erosion. This article traces that pattern with respect to both the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
 This article does not deny that “reform” legislation often contains flaws (as does 
much deregulatory legislation). But these are usually quickly eliminated in the latter half 
of the cycle. The greater dilemma is instead whether the problem of systemic risk can be 
satisfactorily addressed in the presence of the Regulatory Sine Curve. 
 
 
Keywords: Dodd-Frank Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financial regulation, latent group, 
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 A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, 
experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Seas Bubble three hundred 
years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse, can legislators and regulators 
overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive “reform” 
legislation.1  U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this broader 
generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were 
the product of the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression, and their enactment 
had to await the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. The decisive event 
fueling public indignation and shaping these statutes was the Pecora Hearings before the 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, which continued from 1932 to 1934.2 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) was enacted, possibly in some haste, in 2002, following the 
collapse of Enron in late 2001 and WorldCom in 2002 and an accelerating crescendo of 
financial statement restatements by other public corporations.3 Finally, the Dodd-Frank 
                                                 
*
 Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author wishes to thank 
his colleague Professor Robert Jackson for his assistance. 
1
 For the view that securities regulation, over the last 300 years, has depended on market crashes 
to fuel it, see Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?:  300 Years of Evidence, 
75 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1997). 
2
 See Joel Seligman, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET:  A History of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (1982) at 1-2, and 39-40. 
3
 For a description of the increasing rate of financial irregularity and accounting restatements in 
this era leading up to the enactment of SOX, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?:  A 
Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (2004). 
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Act, enacted in 2010,4 followed an even greater financial collapse, one that threatened 
financial institutions on a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the 
attention of a public already infuriated at financial institutions (and their highly 
compensated investment bankers) being bailed out at taxpayer expense. In each of these 
episodes, abundant evidence of financial chicanery and fraud was uncovered, and the 
public was outraged and revulsed. Not surprisingly, in each of these cases, the 
comprehensive reform legislation that followed in the wake of the market collapse 
showed hints of the public’s desire for retribution.5 All that is different this time is that 
the crisis may be wasted – as hereinafter explained. 
 Why is it that securities and financial reform legislation seems only to be passed 
after a crash or similar crisis? The most plausible answer involves a basic and 
foundational theory of political science. Numerous as investors and shareholders are in 
the United States, they are dispersed, disorganized, and their potential political power is 
diffused. Easily distracted by other important issues, their attention span is also short. In 
contrast, the financial services industry is well organized, can keep its focus on the issues 
that most affect it, and has an obvious incentive to maintain a powerful lobbying presence 
that will give them disproportionate influence. Hence, as any reader of Mancur Olson’s 
classic book, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION,6 will recognize, smaller, better-
organized groups are likely to dominate larger, but more diffuse, groups with much 
                                                 
4
 The full title of this statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). It will be called the Dodd-Frank Act herein. 
5
 In the case of SOX, this is clearest in the new criminal penalties and enhanced penalties in 
Section 902 to 906 of SOX. In the case of Dodd-Frank, Section 748 sets forth elaborate 
provisions to protect and subsidize “whistle-blowers” who report misconduct to the SEC. Both 
provisions seek to detect and punish miscreants. 
6
 Mancur Olson, Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1965). 
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greater memberships, in seeking to influence either legislation or regulatory policy.7 
Olson’s prediction that smaller, but more cohesive, interest groups would predictably 
outperform larger citizen-based “latent” groups now seems obvious, but it implies that 
groups representing investors or shareholders are likely to be at a severe disadvantage in 
competing with well-funded business lobbies. 
 If so, how is it then that reform legislation ever passes? Later theorists, building 
on Olson’s model, have focused on the role of “political entrepreneurs.”8 In crises, 
including market crashes, political entrepreneurs gain attention and electoral success, 
they argue, by exploiting the popular discontent. Essentially, these entrepreneurs assume 
the transaction costs of organizing otherwise latent interest groups in order to secure 
                                                 
7
 For later and fuller statements of Olson’s seminal “public choice” perspective, see Russell 
Hardin, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) and Todd Sandler, COLLECTIVE ACTION:  Theory 
and Applications (1992). For a specific application of Olson’s ideas to the world of corporate 
governance, see Robert A Prentice and David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate 
Governance:  How Wise is the Received Wisdom, 95 Geo. L. J. 1843, 1847-49 (2007). 
8
 The “political entrepreneur” or “public entrepreneur” is a creative actor, modeled after Joseph 
Schumpeter’s economic entrepreneur, who solves the essential dilemma in Mancur Olson’s 
theory of collective action:  namely, that individuals would rationally prefer to free ride on the 
efforts of others. Olson was extremely pessimistic about the ability of large groups to take 
meaningful action. Later theorists explain reform legislation as the product of “public 
entrepreneurs” seeking “political profit” in the form of votes or election to office. By 
manipulating incentives and rewarding their coalition partners, these actors motivate otherwise 
passive “latent groups.” See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990); 
Richard B. Wagner, “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs:  A Review Article,” PUBLIC 
CHOICE (1966); Stephen Kuhnert, An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action:  
Schumpetarian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good, 12 Constitutional Political Economy 13-
29 (2001). To summarize, from the perspective of political science, the “public entrepreneur” is 
the dynamic actor who makes possible collective action in the common interest by bearing the 
transaction costs that group members will not bear. Some political figures do appear to have 
played such an entrepreneurial role after both the Enron/WorldCom scandals of 2001-2002 and 
the 2008 financial crisis. The most obvious nominees for such a role in this author’s judgment 
would be Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo, who each moved from New York Attorney General 
to New York Governor after achieving broad recognition for actively challenging misconduct and 
conflicts of interest on Wall Street. It is unclear whether any figure, since SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt, has played a corresponding role in the national government. 
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election (or re-election) by assisting the public to overcome entrenched business 
interests.9 
 For many, this is precisely how republican government ought to function:  leaders 
arise to aggregate the discontent and frustrations of citizens. But to a vocal school of 
conservative critics of securities regulation, such democratic eruptions are dismaying, 
dangerous, and need to be discouraged. The most outspoken and doctrinaire of these 
critics is undoubtedly Yale Law School Professor Roberta Romano. In a well-known 
article, she condemned SOX for imposing “quack corporate governance” on the United 
States.10 Her thesis is, narrowly, that SOX’s key provisions on corporate governance 
were not supported by the then available empirical academic literature and, more 
generally, that when Congress acts in the wake of a financial crisis, it will predictably 
adopt hasty, ill-conceived legislation. Thus, she proposes, among other restrictions, that 
all Congressional legislation regulating the securities markets or corporate governance 
come with a mandatory sunset provision under which the legislation would expire within 
a relative brief period thereafter, unless it was re-adopted by a subsequent Congress.11 
                                                 
9
 See Hardin, supra n. 7, at 35-37 (explaining role of political entrepreneurs who market ideas and 
aggregate support from latent groups). Anthony Downs argues persuasively that only during 
periods of intense public pressure for change, can legislative inertia and interest group veto power 
be overcome and reform legislation passed. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology – 
“The Issue-Attention Cycle”, 28 Pub. Int. 38 (1972). The passage of environmental laws has 
followed this same cycle in the view of several commentators. See Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment – Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-1973, 
9 Duke Envtl. L & Pol’y F. 29, 33-56 (1998). 
10
 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
114 Yale L. J. 1521 (2005). 
11
 Id. at 1600 to 1602. Professor Romano is also highly critical of the role of “policy 
entrepreneurs” in the passage of SOX. Id. at 1568 to 1569. However, she does not use this term in 
any defined or theoretical sense, but simply levies ad hoc criticisms at a variety of officials (some 
elected and some administrative officials), most notably Senator Sarbanes. Id. at 1584. Indeed, 
the “policy entrepreneurs” she most frequently criticizes are SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and 
-6- 
 
 Any such reform, of course, would ignore Mancur Olson’s critical insight:  the 
majority will likely be dominated over the longer term by smaller, but better-motivated, 
interest groups. Thus, crisis breeds an opportunity to overcome legislative inertia. From 
this starting point, it follows that the consequence of a mandatory sunset rule is to protect 
the hegemony of well-financed and better-organized interest groups from majoritarian 
attack. After the financial crisis passes and some semblance of “normalcy” returns, 
potential political entrepreneurs will be less willing to take on a coalition of well-
financed, tightly organized business interest groups, because they would know that the 
dispersed investor community could not maintain its zeal for long. Financial industry 
lobbyists could then easily organize to prevent the re-enactment of the original 
legislation, once it reached its moment of sunset. As a result, passage of significant 
legislation would mark only the midpoint of the political battle, which would become 
more protracted and costly, extending to the end of the sunset period and potentially 
chilling aggressive administrative implementation during the interim.  
 Under the original Romano proposal, reform legislation would automatically 
lapse unless (1) the impact of these provisions were first studied and approved by the 
SEC, and (2) Congress then re-enacted these provisions, based on the SEC’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner. Id. at 1549 to 1550. Neither were politicians who held (or 
had sought) elective office, and hence they did not stand to gain from political activism. Thus, 
they would not satisfy the definition of public entrepreneurs used in much of the political science 
literature as one seeking political profit. See supra note 8. Rather, these persons come closer to 
being technocrats (although on the highest level). Thus, Professor Romano’s critique of the 
individuals most involved in the enactment of SOX never integrates with any broader theory, and 
she never discusses Mancur Olson or other political science theorists. Her article seems generally 
unaware of the political science literature and focuses exclusively on empirical economics. 
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endorsement, within a few years thereafter.12 More recently, she has refined her 
procedures, but still insisted on a mandatory sunset after five to six years, not just for 
securities laws, but for all “foundational financial legislation.”13 Thus, under her 
approach, not only the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
would have expired by the end of the 1930s, but similarly the Glass-Steagall Act or 
legislation regulating the capital adequacy and risk management polices of banks and 
other financial institutions would also self-destruct, unless spared by Congress. Such an 
outcome seems sensible only if one believes (as she may) that markets need little 
regulation (and thus that regulatory interventions should be short-lived, disappearing like 
snowflakes in the sun). 
 Nonetheless, Professor Romano has her loyal allies.14 Together, they comprise 
what might be called the “Tea Party Caucus” of corporate and securities law professors,15 
                                                 
12
 Id. at 1601. Even with SEC endorsement, she contemplates that Congress would still have to 
re-enact the statute. 
13
 See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, Yale Law School Working Paper (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148) (December 18, 2011). Under her revised proposal, the sunset 
would take effect in five to six years. Id. at 15. 
14
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY:  
UNDERSTANDING HOW SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS (2006); Henry 
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE:  WHAT WE’VE 
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Stephen N. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley:  Legislating in 
Haste, Repenting in Leisure, 2 Corp. Governance L. Rev. 69 (2006);  Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox:  
The Road to Nirvana, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 
Hous. L. Rev. 77 (2003-2004); Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley:  
Raising the Rent on U.S. Law, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. 299 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Markets v. 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:  A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. 
Corp. L. (2002-2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 N.Z.L. Rev. 
365 (2005). 
 Although these authors do not tire of criticizing SOX, they have not convinced others. 
Reviewing the same economic evidence, Professor John C. Coates finds it harder to balance the 
costs and benefits of SOX and generally takes a more balanced position. John C. Coates, The 
Goals and Promises of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. Econ. Perspectives 91 (2007). Viewing 
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and their key themes are:  (1) Congress should not legislate after a market crash, because 
the result will be a “Bubble Law” that crudely overregulates,16 (2) state laws are superior 
to federal law in regulating corporate governance, because the states are restrained by the 
competitive pressure of the market for corporate charters; and (3) federal securities law 
should limit itself to disclosure (at most) and not attempt substantive regulation of 
corporate governance.17 The underlying theory here comes very close to asserting that 
                                                                                                                                                 
SOX in a less economic light, Professor Donald Langevoort sees SOX as reflecting a shift by 
Congress from an exclusively contractarian perspective to a more trust-based conception of the 
corporation. See Donald Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1817, 1828-1833 (2007). 
15
 While there is irony in this term, it is also intended to be accurate; the three occupy a polar 
position at one end of the continuum in terms of their unbroken skepticism and rejection of 
governmental regulation. At the same time, as I am happy to recognize, all three are original and 
creative legal scholars. 
16
 Both Professors Bainbridge and Ribstein regularly use the term “Bubble Law” to refer to 
federal legislation adopted in the wake of a crash that tends to displace state corporate law. See 
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, supra note 14, and Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:  Quack Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779 (2011). 
17
 Professor Romano has argued that the federal securities laws had historically avoided 
substantive regulation of corporate behavior, staying safely “within a disclosure regime.” See 
Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 229, 231 
(2009). The distinctive failure of SOX in her view “is its break with the historic federal regulatory 
approach of requiring disclosure and leaving substantive governance rules to the states’ 
corporation codes.” Id. at 232. This is a dubious historical generalization. Although the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do utilize disclosure as their preferred tool, 
the federal securities laws have frequently regulated substantive corporate conduct and 
governance. The most controversial federal securities statute of the 1930s was the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, which imposed a “death sentence” on public utility pyramids and 
holding company structures – clearly an example of aggressive substantive regulation. See J. 
Seligman, supra note 2, at 122-23 (describing the Public Utility Holding Company Act as “the 
most radical reform measure of the Roosevelt Administration”). Similarly, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 regulates the board structure of investment companies; initially, it required 
a minimum 40% of each investment company’s board be composed of disinterested directors (Id. 
at 228-229), and it also compels them to hold a diversified portfolio and not sell securities “short” 
– again substantive regulation. More recently, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act required stronger 
internal controls over financial reporting (as Professor Romano acknowledges). See Romano, 
supra, at 231. Thus, SOX was only a break with an imagined past in which the federal securities 
laws exclusively required disclosure.  
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democracy is bad for corporate efficiency, and thus legislative inertia should be 
encouraged. 
 This article is not a response to Professor Romano’s sunset proposal. That idea is 
unlikely to gain any serious traction outside of the small community of free market and 
libertarian theorists who believe financial markets are naturally self-regulating. But this 
article is a response to the world view favored by these scholars and an attempt to focus 
attention on the critical implementation stage at which reform legislation is regularly 
frustrated. Here, it must be acknowledged that the Tea Party Caucus is having an impact, 
particularly as they shift their focus from SOX to the Dodd-Frank Act where the stakes 
are higher. With the same fervor that they once attacked SOX, they are now seeking the 
dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, which they also view as having imposed “quack 
corporate governance” on the financial markets.18  
 In response, this article will argue that their shared thesis is unsound for at least 
three reasons:  (1) unhappy as they may be with democratic majorities, they have no 
coherent theory that explains why democratic majorities should be constrained in their 
                                                 
18
 See Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:  Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1779 (2011). Like Professor Romano, Professor Bainbridge is also suspicious of “suspect 
policy entrepreneurs” who were in his view seeking “to advance a long-standing political 
agenda.” Id. at 1816. For him, the “suspects” are activists within the “institutional community, 
especially union and state and local pension funds.” Id. Citing Professor Romano, he speculates 
that these activists are seeking to “reap private benefits not shared with other investors.” Id. 
Although this could conceivably be true in some instances, he provides little, if any, evidence and 
wholly ignores the even greater possibility that the business interests resisting “reform” are also 
seeking to gain (or protect) private benefits of their own. For example, corporate executives 
opposed to “say on pay” or other compensation reforms have a clearer self-interest and more 
evident desire for private benefits than do the public pension funds who favor “say on pay.” 
 Professor Romano has also made clear that she views the Dodd-Frank Act as being as 
defective as SOX. See Romano, supra note 13, at 9-11. 
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ability to act after a crisis;19 (2) they fail to understand the ease with which legislative 
mistakes or misjudgments can be corrected in the process of administrative 
implementation;20 and (3) even if it is conceded that legislative misjudgments are often 
made, their proposed reforms (most notably the mandatory sunset provision) are an 
unnecessary “fifth wheel,” given the ease with which business interest groups can push 
back, repealing or downsizing legislation whenever they can make a colorable case that 
the legislation’s costs exceed its benefits. Although Professor Romano argues that it 
would “take a Herculean effort to repeal [SOX’s reforms] given the organization of 
government,”21 one has to wear blinders to make this statement. The downsizing of SOX, 
as later detailed, began quickly after its passage in 2002 and continues to date. Legislative 
efforts to repeal or downsize much of the Dodd-Frank Act are already well-advanced.22 
Professor Romano and her allies thus miss exactly what a Mancur Olson would have 
predicted:  once the crisis subsides, more organized interests groups regain the upper 
hand and begin to extract concessions, exemptions or outright repeal.  
                                                 
19
 Reasonable people can, of course, disagree about the costs and benefits of most statutes. But 
the claim made by Professor Romano and her allies is that post-crash legislation almost invariably 
fails. This is a heroic claim that must also factor into its calculus the costs of crashes in under-
regulated markets. Professor Romano’s distinctive claim is that “policy entrepreneurs” 
incorporate their pre-conceived policy agendas into hasty legislation. Ultimately, everyone has 
pre-conceived ideas to which they turn in a crisis, and, as later discussed, the core ideas 
underlying SOX came from the administrative agency with the most information and experience 
in the field (i.e., the SEC), not from some idiosyncratic lone Congressman. 
20
 See text and notes infra at notes 47 to 48 (discussing exemptive authority possessed by 
Securities and Exchange Commission under the federal securities laws). Professor Romano at no 
point discusses this authority, which permits the SEC to escape overly burdensome regulation 
without the need for legislative action. Perhaps, she believes the SEC is “captured” by liberal 
“policy entrepreneurs,” but her silence on this point is revealing.  
21
 See Romano, supra note 13, at 6-7. 
22
 See text and notes infra at notes 174 to 180. 
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 Interestingly, the erosion of SOX has had almost nothing to do with the 
weaknesses diagnosed by Professor Romano – i.e., the haste surrounding its passage or 
the asserted lack of empirical evidence supporting its reforms. Rather, what has most 
motivated the opposition to SOX was the high costs of the requirement in SOX Section 
404 for tighter internal controls on financial reporting.23 Yet, these costs resulted not 
from the legislation, itself, but from unanticipated, post-enactment administrative 
action.24 Those costs have already been reduced by administrative and legislative action, 
but the business community remains unsatisfied and senses that complete victory is 
obtainable (and without any mandatory sunset legislation).25 Given their relative success, 
this episode hardly evidences the need for sunset provisions, as the business community 
seems more than capable of protecting its own interests. 
 Similarly, as the opposition to the Dodd-Frank Act mounts, this counterreaction is 
being driven by attempts to protect executive compensation, high leverage, bank 
profitability, and managerial discretion – each of which has powerful champions. In 
contrast, the goal of curbing systemic risk has no obvious political champion among the 
usual participants in the political process of financial regulation.26 Given the resulting 
                                                 
23
 See 15 U.S.C. § 7262. For a more detailed discussion of this provision, see text and notes infra 
at notes 59 to 67. 
24
 As later discussed, the high costs of Section 404 came not from any provision of the statute, but 
from action taken by a self-regulatory body (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”)), which required that the auditors conduct a full-scale audit before attesting under 
Section 404(b) to management’s evaluation of its internal controls. See text and notes infra at 59 
to 66. SOX’s Section 404 imposed only the requirement that the auditor “attest to management 
evaluation.” This is hardly evidence of legislative haste or of a populist eruption. A cynic might 
well attribute the high costs of a Section 404 audit to either a desire on the part of the 
accountants’ self-regulator to benefit accountants with high fees or to the limited competition 
within the highly concentrated accounting industry. 
25
 See text and notes infra at notes 69 to 71 and notes 174 to 180. 
26
 See text and notes infra at notes 37 to 38. 
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imbalance, Mancur Olson’s model predicts the likely outcome:  interest group politics 
will produce major revisions to the Dodd-Frank Act, both in the administrative and 
legislative processes.  
 Although SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act share many similarities, two major 
differences between them stand out and suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act is even more 
vulnerable:  First, the Dodd-Frank Act has a much narrower focus than SOX and intends 
reforms that could prove much more costly to financial institutions than anything in SOX. 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act also makes some attempts to regulate corporate 
governance at public corporations, it concentrates to a much greater extent on the 
problem of systemic risk at large (“too big to fail”) financial institutions. Unfortunately, 
systemic risk is a complex and relatively opaque concept which the average citizen does 
not understand or easily identify with. Second, the Dodd-Frank Act depends upon 
administrative implementation to a far greater degree than did SOX because Congress 
simply could not specify in detail all the proper steps that needed to be taken with respect 
to capital adequacy, liquidity ratios, OTC derivatives, and similar complex financial 
issues applicable mainly to large financial institutions. For both reasons, the Dodd-Frank 
Act is particularly exposed to what may happen in the post-euphoric period after the 
legislation passes when public’s attention turns elsewhere and business interest groups 
reestablish their usual dominance over the technical process of policy implementation.  
 If one believes that systemic risk is a serious problem that needs to be addressed 
rigorously, this vulnerability is disquieting because, as later described, SOX was 
effectively downsized in the period after its passage – by subsequent legislation, 
equivocal agency rule-making, judicial hostility, and timid underenforcement by 
-13- 
 
regulators. That pattern may well repeat – with the result that adequate protections 
against systemic risk will not be implemented. This claim does not rest on any premise 
that regulatory agencies have actually been “captured” by the financial industry,27 but 
that industry may gain influence at the administrative implementation stage and may 
force regulators to trim their sails. Not only does the administrative stage inherently have 
lower visibility and is at least as susceptible to lobbying pressure (because of the 
influence of the “revolving door” on bureaucratic staffers who expect eventually to return 
to the financial industry28), but industry efforts at this later, more pedestrian stage are less 
likely to attract challenges from political entrepreneurs who appear in crises to champion 
the cause of investors.  
 A roadmap of this article is now in order. Part I of this article present a model of 
how financial reform legislation is frustrated and downsized. This model does not depend 
on “industry capture,”29 but rather applies the insights of Mancur Olson (and others) to 
the real world of lobbying and administrative implementation. Part I will also contrast 
this model with that offered by Professor Romano and her allies. Next, on the premise 
that what is past is prologue, Part II of this article will examine how SOX’s provisions 
were weakened, abandoned, or downsized at the implementation stage. Such 
administrative softening (or even abandonment) of legislative enactments may be even 
                                                 
27
 The term “capture” is inherently elusive and suggests that a permanent victory is won by the 
industry. In contrast, this article suggests that the opposing sides can each dominate at various 
points, but the forces championing public-regarding legislation are only advantaged after a major 
crisis. 
28
 This topic is being increasingly debated in the press. See Andrew Ross Sorkin’s, “The SEC’s 
Revolving Door,” New York Times, August 2, 2011 at Dealbook, p. 1. 
29
 Professor Romano asserts that this author assumes that administrative agencies have been 
captured. See Romano, supra note 13, at 18 to 19. No such assumption is made, but some 
agencies are very resource constrained and may also be intimidated by a hostile Congress with 
control over their budget. 
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more likely in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act, because (1) the prospective costs to the 
financial industry are higher, (2) the Dodd-Frank Act has no natural allies among the 
major political players who usually support “reform” legislation applicable to the 
financial markets;30 and (3) the Dodd-Frank Act is even more dependent on 
administrative implementation and rule-making. Part III will examine the policy premises 
underlying the Dodd-Frank Act. Rather than idealize this legislation, it will acknowledge 
that some of its reforms were flawed or even inconsistent. But legislation in the real 
world will always be imperfect; this is the necessary consequence of the logrolling and 
compromise needed to assemble a majority in a divided political environment. Part IV 
will then turn to the implementation of Dodd-Frank and the associated attempts – 
legislative and judicial – to downsize it. The evidence to date suggests that a crisis is 
being wasted, and thus the danger of future systemic risk catastrophes remains clear and 
present. All this will set the stage for a concluding section that will ask (and only partially 
answer) the ultimate question:  what reforms could work? 
 Part I.  The Regulatory Sine Curve and Statutory Correction 
 This article’s fundamental premise is that a “Regulatory Sine Curve” governs the 
intensity of the oversight exercised by financial regulators. By this phrase, it is meant 
both that (1) regulatory intensity is never constant, but rather increases after a market 
crash, and then wanes as (and to the extent that) society and the market return to 
normalcy, and (2) the public’s passion for reform is short-lived and the support it gives to 
political entrepreneurs who seek to oppose powerful interest groups on behalf of the 
public also wanes after a brief window of opportunity. This same pattern may 
                                                 
30
 See text and notes infra at notes 36 to 38. 
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characterize other forms of regulation (for example, environmental regulation may wax 
and wane also with highly publicized, vivid environmental disasters), but important 
differences exist. Financial regulation is inherently opaque, and the public lacks the same 
visceral identification with the key values in play. Few in the public care as passionately 
about systemic risk as they may care about the environment or civil rights. Thus, the 
public’s attention span may be shorter, and the window of opportunity briefer within 
which reform legislation can be passed. 
 The key implication of the Regulatory Sine Curve is not that legislation is futile, 
but that erosion of the statute’s commands will predictably begin shortly after its passage. 
Core provisions of the legislation will likely remain (just as the core provisions of the 
federal securities laws, including those of SOX, remain in place), and sometimes courts 
will fill in the gaps in legislation expansively.31 Nonetheless, the greater the legislation’s 
reliance on administrative implementation, the greater the erosion that becomes likely, at 
least if the legislation conflicts with the industry’s preferences. This perspective posits 
both that downsizing and correction is inevitable and that, to a degree, it may often even 
be desirable. But the likelihood of such erosion also justifies strong legislative action in 
the first instance (and possibly the framing of some key policies in prophylactic terms 
that prevent or at least retard their erosion). This perspective fundamentally conflicts with 
that of Professor Romano and the Tea Party Caucus, who believe that reform legislation 
passed after a crash will always enact foolish “quack cures” and thus should be 
                                                 
31
 Certainly, the federal courts aggressively filled in the gaps in the federal securities laws in the 
1960s by, among other things, implying private causes of action. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a private cause of action to enforce federal securities laws). That 
period of liberal construction of the federal securities laws has now ended, but courts may uphold 
or invalidate administrative rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act to the extent they understand 
and accept the purpose of the legislation. 
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discouraged. For both sides, a common starting point is the recognition that (i) legislation 
is often flawed and unrationalized and (ii) SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act have their own 
curious, overbroad and inconsistent elements. But this article responds that the likelihood 
of legislative errors and misjudgments hardly merits Draconian measures (such as a 
sunset provision) because “correction” is both possible through a variety of less drastic 
and more feasible means and probably inevitable in light of the Regulatory Sine Curve.  
 The standard cyclical progression along the Regulatory Sine Curve (from intense 
to lax enforcement) is driven by a basic asymmetry between the power, resources and 
organization of the latent group (i.e., investors) and the interest groups affected by the 
specific legislation. Cohesion among investors begins to break down once “normalcy” 
returns. Professor Romano has disputed this view of investors as a dispersed latent 
group,32 chiefly for two reasons:  (1) investors, she argues, are effectively represented in 
the typical legislative battles over financial regulation by powerful champions, most 
notably, in her view, “well-funded and politically influential labor unions, public pension 
funds, and the plaintiff’s bar”33; and (2) business is not “monolithic” but has often 
conflicting interests.34 
 Both claims are easily refuted. Most recent studies have found that business 
groups dominate the lobbying process.35 Thus, to consider public pension funds a 
                                                 
32
 She acknowledges that her work never discusses Mancur Olson and related theorists but asserts 
that “it would be a mistake to do so.” See Romano, supra note 13, at 20 n. 11. 
33
 Id. at 21. 
34
 Id. at 21. 
35
 Political scientists have assembled a great deal of evidence on this score. As one survey by 
them summarizes: 
“Whether we measure it by organizations represented, by money spent, by issues 
acted on, or participation in rule-making, we see that businesses and trade 
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counterweight to major financial institutions is to mistake an ox for a bull. Pension funds, 
as fiduciaries for their beneficiaries, do not make political contributions and are thus 
relatively impotent as political actors. Labor unions can, of course, lobby and make 
political contributions, but their political power has steadily subsided for decades as the 
percentage of the U.S. work force that is unionized has declined.36 The plaintiff’s bar 
may be active in politics, but its financial resources are also dwarfed by those of the 
major financial institutions, and, as a practical matter, both unions and the plaintiff’s bar 
largely limit their efforts to the Democratic side of the political aisle (while business 
groups contribute heavily to both sides).37 
 Equally important, these three alleged champions of investors in the political 
process often have interests that diverge from those of investors. To the extent that closer 
regulation of banks and financial institutions would restrict their ability to increase 
                                                                                                                                                 
associations consistently mobilize at roughly ten times the rate that those forces 
that might countervail them do.” 
See Dorie Appollonio, Bruce Cain, and Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying:  Looking Beyond 
the Corruption Paradigm, 36 Hastings Const. L. Q. 13, 47 (2008). This study further reports data 
on lobbying expenditures and finds that 71.7% of such expenditures are made by “business,” 
while only 4.2% are made by “labor.” Id. at 50 (Table 2). Examining spending on federal 
lobbying, they also find that the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” sector is the single largest spender, 
while labor ranks only eighth. Id. at Table 3. Finally, whatever the data shows with regard to the 
past, there is new evidence that corporate political and lobbying expenditures have significantly 
increased in response to a recent Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment 
protects certain corporate political contributions. See John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics, 
Governance and Value Before and After Citizens United, (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975421) (December 22, 2011). 
36
 Appollonio, Cain and Drutman report that in 2006 the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” lobby expended 
$258.9 million, while “labor” expended $66.6 million – a roughly four to one ratio. Id. at 50 
(Table 3). Of course, this understates the real disparity because political contributions and 
lobbying by labor almost certainly does not concentrate on financial sector issues, but on 
traditional labor issues. 
37
 Apollonio, Cain, and Drutman report data showing that the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” lobby 
allocates its expenditures 54% to Republicans and 44% to Democrats, while labor allocates 12% 
to Republicans and 87% to Democrats. Id. at Table 3. 
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lending or to underwrite subprime mortgages, this is contrary to the natural interests of 
unions, who tend to favor easy credit and increased lending. Increased lending, after all, 
creates jobs, and job creation is a principal goal of both labor and some civil rights 
groups. In short, those seeking to reduce systemic risk have few natural political allies; it 
is a cause that unites largely the technocrats. 
 Professor Romano’s claim that business is not “monolithic” is, of course, correct 
to a degree. Often, business interest groups do battle each other. But the interests of the 
financial services industry are remarkably well aligned in opposing increased regulation 
of their capital structure, leverage, executive compensation and risk management 
policies, and they have been vocal in claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act places them at a 
competitive disadvantage in an increasingly global marketplace.38 At a minimum, the 
business community shares a common desire to resist the encroachment of regulatory 
power over their capital, leverage, and compensation decision-making. It is entirely 
understandable that they resist, but such regulatory oversight is exactly what the goal of 
limiting systemic risk requires. 
 Professor Romano proceeds directly from her premise that reform legislation is 
always flawed to her conclusion that mandatory sunset legislation is necessary. Others 
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 Indeed, Professor Romano herself argues that much of the business community is united in 
opposition to the Dodd-Frank Act, believing it has “exacerbated the severe economic downturn 
that has followed the global financial crisis.” Romano, supra note 13, at 9. For a representative 
and revealing statement by the financial services industry that it considers both Dodd-Frank Act 
and Basel III a threat to the U.S. economy and international competitiveness, see “Rules Present a 
Grave Threat to the Economy,” Targeted News Service, October 3, 2011 (summarizing press 




have pointed out that the mandatory sunset remedy lacks any serious empirical support.39 
This seems a curious omission for someone whose primary objection to reform 
legislation is that Congress did not wait for empirical research to discover the optimal 
remedy.40 Still, in the absence of such research, it is useful to ask two questions:  (1) 
What would be the likely consequences of a sunset requirement?, and (2) What are the 
less drastic alternatives to her proposed sunset rule? 
 With regard to the first question, the existing imbalance between the resources of 
the contending sides in legislative battles over financial regulation would be greatly 
compounded by any mandatory sunset remedy. The “reform” side would have to win 
twice, including after the crisis subsides. The necessary second legislative affirmation of 
the original victory might be denied because of a minority veto (for example, because of 
a blocking position on a key committee or a filibuster). It was exactly for this reason that 
Justice (then Professor) Breyer in a well-known book on reforming the administrative 
process decided that a mandatory sunset law was too Draconian a remedy.41 Further, to 
the extent that the recurring battle over financial regulation is between those who want 
more regulation and those who want less, a sunset remedy is inherently one-sided 
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 See Prentice and Spence, supra note 7, at1855 (noting that Professor Romano “offers no 
evidence that laws enacted in a short time frame tend to have more problems than laws enacted 
over a longer period” and “no empirical evidence that sunshine laws provide any benefits on 
balance”). It seems ironically inconsistent for Professor Romano to criticize Congress for 
enacting many of SOX’s provisions without (in her view) adequate empirical support and then for 
her to propose a legislative remedy of her own (a mandatory sunset rule) that also has no 
empirical support.  
40
 Although Professor Romano believes there is “long and well established U.S. experience with 
sunset legislation,” she concedes that “[t]here is a dearth of research empirically analyzing sunset 
reviews,” and the research that does exist is “mostly qualitative.” Romano, supra note 13, at 17 n. 
9. In short, her own proposal does not have the empirical foundation that she insisted SOX and 
the Dodd-Frank Act should have. 
41
 See Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) at 366-367. 
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because it applies only to legislation that imposes new regulation and not to legislation 
that repeals existing regulation. In truth, deregulation can equally be achieved in haste, 
with the consequence being ill-considered “reforms” that expose financial markets to 
catastrophe.42 If her remedy were truly even-handed, it would apply to deregulatory 
provisions as well. Either way, the cost of such a remedy is continuing uncertainty and 
potential paralysis, as nothing could be assumed to be permanent.43  
 To disagree with Professor Romano’s reforms, it is not necessary to take the 
opposite position to her on all issues. One need not claim that reform legislation is 
typically carefully written or well-planned. Rather, this article starts from the view stated 
by Bismarck over a century ago, when he compared the framing of legislation to the 
making of sausage.44 Political compromises are often unprincipled, odd, and place 
together strange bedfellows. Haste (Professor Romano’s obsession) contributes to this 
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 A good example of hasty deregulatory legislation would be the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365, which 
exempted over-the-counter derivatives, including swaps, from the jurisdiction of both the 
Commodities Future Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
Act’s wholesale deregulation of swaps in 2000 set the stage for AIG’s collapse in 2008 when it 
could not honor the enormous commitments that it had made by means of unregulated credit 
default swaps. 
43
 For example, if, pursuant to such an even-handed sunset, the CFMA had been subjected to an 
automatic termination if Congress did not reaffirm it within five years, the institutions writing 
credit defaults swaps over this interim might have faced considerable uncertainty that could have 
chilled their willingness to enter this field. Even more frightening (to all except the extreme right) 
is the idea that the Federal Reserve Board could similarly vanish, if a polarized Congress could 
not act within Professor Romano’s proposed deadline. 
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 Otto von Bismark (1815-1898), the Chancellor of Imperial Germany, is reputed to have said:  




state of affairs,45 but it is only one of many factors. Indeed, it is not clear that slow and 
piecemeal legislative reform is any less flawed.46  
 Even if haste does produce error (as seems logical), this risk does not imply that 
reformers should remain passive after a financial crisis. At worst, they will face an 
imperfect choice:  act quickly and imperfectly, within a brief window of opportunity, or 
face the likelihood that the forces of legislative inertia will regain the upper hand and 
prevent any reform. In fact, however, the choice is usually less stark than this. The key 
lesson to be learned from reviewing the response to SOX is that the “correction” of 
reform legislation is virtually inevitable. In turn, this undercuts the case for legislative 
passivity or mandatory sunsets. Those whose oxen are gored will predictably organize to 
secure relief. As later described, SOX exemplifies this pattern.  
 Accordingly, what is the best, most feasible remedy for legislative error and 
misjudgment? In this article’s view, it is the remedy that already exists under the federal 
securities laws and that Professor Romano never discusses. Under Section 36 of the 
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 In fact, courts have noted that SOX was “hastily passed and poorly drafted.” See In re Enron 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8158 at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); In re Adelphia 
Communications Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10349 at *5 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2005). On the 
other hand, other courts have observed that drafting ambiguities arise in all major legislation and 
are eventually corrected or clarified. Thus, in SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 22004827 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003), United States District Judge Jed Rakoff wrote: 
“While Sarbanes-Oxley has been criticized in some quarters, there can be no 
doubt that it addresses some of the very problems presented by this Company’s 
history. . . . As with other major legislation covering significant new territory, 
there are provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that will benefit from either clarifying 
regulations or from exemptive actions.” Id. at *17 and n. 43. 
This article agrees with Judge Rakoff:  a corrective process naturally follows comprehensive 
legislation (whether it is adopted in haste or more deliberately). 
46
 Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, separating investment banking from commercial 
banking in haste in 1932, then repealed it slowly over several decades, culminating with the 




Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and similar sections in other federal securities laws), 
the SEC possesses “general exemptive authority” and can “conditionally or 
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of 
persons, securities or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title, or any 
rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”47 
This is fairly sweeping language that gives broad authority to the administrative agency, 
which will have the benefit of greater information and post-enactment experience, to 
override Congress.  
 The advantages of such an administrative exemptive approach begin with the fact 
that, under it, delay, stalling tactics, or a minority veto could not overturn a prior 
Congressional enactment. Uncertainty is also reduced, as an administrative agency, with 
greater experience and objectivity, must be persuaded to act. The agency’s actions are 
likely to be both more predictable and more incremental, thus avoiding the uncertain all-
or-nothing choice inherent in sunset provisions. Only if one believes that the SEC has 
been “captured” by some interest group does this more tailored and precise remedy seem 
inferior to a gamble on a sunset provision.48 
 To sum up, the contrast between the Tea Party Caucus’s perspective and that 
taken here is basic, but both share some common elements. Under the world as viewed by 
Professor Romano and her allies, reform legislation follows “a media clamor for 
                                                 
47
 See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm. This provision was added in 1996 by Pub. L. 104-290. Similar 
exemptive provisions are set forth in Section 28 (“General Exemptive Authority”) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3, and Section 206A (“Exemptions”) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a.  
48
 Because Professor Romano never discusses the option of agency exemptive authority, one 
cannot know her criticisms of it (or even if she was aware of these provisions).  
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action,”49 and this “media frenzy . . . compels legislators not only to respond, but to 
respond quickly, even though they  . . . cannot possibly determine what would be the best 
policy to adopt in the circumstances.”50 Typically, she argues, they adopt “recycled 
proposals fashioned to resolve quite unrelated problems, imagined or real, which policy 
entrepreneurs advance as ready-made solutions to immediate concerns, to a Congress in 
need of off-the-shelf proposals that can be enacted quickly.”51 Further, because Congress 
is risk averse and self-interested, Congress delegates great discretion to administrative 
agencies as “a means by which legislators can avoid responsibility for adverse policy 
consequences.”52 
 The alternative view, here presented, agrees that crisis is a precipitant, allowing 
legislative inertia to be overcome. After a crisis, Congress tends to adopt proposals that 
the relevant administrative agency has long favored, but that were frustrated by powerful 
lobbies. Only with a crisis can reformers (or “political entrepreneurs” in the political 
science vernacular) aggregate sufficient support to pass reform legislation. For example, 
in the years prior to the Enron and WorldCom crisis in 2001-2002, SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt had sought to respond to a soaring number of financial statement restatements and 
had campaigned to restrict auditor conflicts of interest.53 But he was rebuffed by the 
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 See Romano, supra note 13, at 4. 
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 Id. at 5-6. 
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 Id. at 6. 
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 Id. at 8. 
53
 Financial statement restatements at publicly traded companies appear to have risen from 49 in 
1996 to an estimated 250 in 2002, or an increase of approximately 270 percent over the five years 
ending in 2002. See, John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?:  A Capsule Social and Economic 
History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 283 (2004). 
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industry.54 With the Enron and WorldCom’s insolvencies and the evidence of financial 
impropriety manifest to all, Levitt and others (most notably, Senator Paul Sarbanes) were 
able to convince Congress to replace auditor self-regulation with a new body:  the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).55 The PCAOB was the centerpiece 
of SOX, but it was hardly an “off-the-shelf” proposal. But for the crisis, auditor self-
regulation would have persisted. Depending on which perspective is preferred, Arthur 
Levitt and Paul Sarbanes are either the heroes or villains of this story.56 
 But the story does not end there. “Correction” does follow, both in the form of 
administrative rules that soften some legislative commands and in the form of legislation 
curbing the prior statute. The next section will describe this process in more detail, as it 
applied to SOX, and a later section will turn to the Dodd-Frank Act. Reasonable persons 
can disagree about whether this corrective process went too far (as this author tends to 
believe) or not far enough. But it is an inevitable part of the Regulatory Sine Curve, 
which is next examined in operation. 
Part II: SOX Revisited:  The Downsizing of Reform 
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 Even Professor Romano has recognized that “the provision of nonaudit services by auditors had 
been subject to persistent efforts at elimination by the SEC prior to SOX’s prohibition.” See 
Romano, supra note 10, at 1534. Thus, the legislative provisions that she most objects to in SOX 
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field had clearly detected a decline in the performance of a critical gatekeeper. 
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2002. See Sections 101 to 110, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211 to 7220. 
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 Professor Romano’s article on “Quack Corporate Governance” principally 
focused on four areas where, in her view, SOX’s reforms were unsupported by the 
empirical academic literature:  (1) independent audit committees; (2) the restrictions on 
auditors providing nonaudit services to audit clients; (3) executive loans, and (4) 
executive certification of financial statements.57 Interestingly, the efforts to revise or 
downsize SOX have largely ignored the first three of these areas. In contrast, the fourth 
area (the prohibition on executive loans) has been quickly and quietly curtailed as a result 
of collective action taken by the private bar (and acquiesced in by the SEC).58 The weight 
of academic empirical research appears not to have had much impact either on SOX’s 
proponents or its critics. Instead, the business community focused primarily on softening 
the requirements imposed by SOX’s Section 404, which required an annual independent 
review of a public company’s internal controls that became more costly than most had 
anticipated. 
 This section will focus on those areas where SOX encountered the greatest 
resistance or has been the most abandoned:  (1) Section 404; (2) executive loans; and (3), 
Section 307, which required lawyers representing the corporation to report securities (and 
similar) violations up the corporate ladder.  
 A.  Section 404 and Internal Control Reports. Although Section 404 of SOX 
became highly controversial in time, it was a “sleeper” provision that attracted 
comparatively little attention initially. As passed, it mandated only that the SEC adopt a 
new “internal control report” that had to be included in the issuers’ annual report on Form 
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10-K.59 In this report, management had to assess the effectiveness of management’s 
internal controls over financial reporting. Then, Section 404(b) required the company’s 
outside auditor to “attest to and report on” management’s assessment.60 Such an 
attestation requirement was not inherently costly. What made this provision become 
costly and controversial was the subsequent decision of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), made two years after SOX’s passage, to require a full scale 
audit of the issuer’s internal controls before the auditor might so attest. Under its 
Auditing Standard No. 2, adopted in 2004,61 the PCAOB required the auditor to test and 
evaluate both the design and operating effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls 
before it could deem itself satisfied with management’s own assessment requirement. 
Effectively, this implied that the auditor must conduct two full audits:  the first being the 
traditional audit of the issuer’s financial statements, and the second being the audit of the 
issuer’s internal controls. 
 This proved expensive and provoked a political reaction. But the decision to 
require a full audit was not the product of SOX, itself. The accounting profession largely 
welcomed this dual audit requirement, which proved very lucrative for them. 
Nonetheless, if auditors were happy with this rule, issuers were not. Almost immediately 
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 Section 404(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Management Assessment of Internal Controls”) 
required an “annual internal control report” that contained “an assessment , as of the end of the 
most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and 
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[Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.]” 
61
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following the adoption of Auditing Standard No. 2 in 2004, issuers and others began to 
call for it to be downsized. In 2006, an SEC Advisory Committee recommended that this 
internal controls audit be waived in the case of smaller companies, which it defined as 
those with a market capitalization under $125 million.62 Foreign issuers, who began to 
delist from U.S. exchanges in significant numbers in the period after 2000, often pointed 
to Section 404 as a leading cause of their decision to flee the U.S. markets. Both 
successfully delayed the application of Section 404 to them. 
 Finally, in 2007, the PCAOB relaxed Auditing Standard No. 2 by replacing it with 
Auditing Standard No. 5, which softened a number of its requirements.63 An announced 
intention of this revision was to reduce audit costs, particularly for smaller companies.64 
A follow up SEC study of Section 404 found a significant decrease in audit costs as a 
result of the 2007 changes.65 
 Still, this marginal improvement did not satisfy Congress. The Dodd-Frank Act 
continued the downsizing of the internal controls audit by exempting from Section 404(b) 
issuers that were neither “accelerated filers” nor “large accelerated filers.”66 Effectively, 
this meant that non-accelerated filers (i.e., filers with a market capitalization of $75 
million or less) were still required to include management’s evaluation of its internal 
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controls in their Annual Report on Form 10-K, but they no longer had to include their 
auditor’s attestation to that report (which would have required an audit under the 
PCAOB’s rules).67 The SEC further accommodated newer issuers by delaying Section 
404’s internal control attestations until a public company was required to file its second 
Form 10-K, thereby effectively giving a company two years after its IPO before such a 
report was due.68 
 Even the Dodd-Frank Act’s partial repeal of Section 404 has not ended the push 
for still greater downsizing. In late 2011, the Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, a 
White House-created advisory body, issued a report calling for the massive downsizing 
of SOX’s requirements with respect to public companies having a market capitalization 
below $1 billion.69 Section 404 seems to be the primary target (but hardly the exclusive 
one). The proposed $1 billion market capitalization cutoff would exempt roughly two-
thirds of the roughly 5,700 public companies listed on major U.S. stock exchanges.70 This 
proposal has already elicited a sharp editorial rebuke from the New York Times,71 but the 
proposal does appear to have bipartisan support. 
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 See “Not Their Job,” New York Times, October 20, 2011 at p. 28. Pending legislation would 
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 Reasonable persons can debate the wisdom of the PCAOB’s various actions (both 
in requiring an audit of internal controls and then in sparing from that audit smaller 
issuers, who are actually more likely to experience internal control problems).72 But three 
conclusions seem justified:  (1) “Hasty” Congressional action did not cause the Section 
404 crisis (rather more deliberate action by a politically neutral, self-regulatory 
organization did); (2) A corrective process curbed much of the perceived problem within 
a few years of SOX’s passage (and may yet sweep away still more of SOX’s provisions); 
and (3) Even Section 404 will not be nullified, as the maximum proposed retrenchment 
would still leave the internal controls audit in place for larger companies with a market 
capitalization over $1 billion. Again, whether this corrective process went too far or not 
far enough can be debated, but it exemplifies the Regulatory Sine Curve in operation. 
Dodd-Frank is likely to receive similar treatment. 
 B.  Executive Loans and Section 402. Section 402 of SOX is distinctive. Unlike 
other provisions of SOX (or the Dodd-Frank Act) that authorize agency rule-making, 
Section 402 baldly prohibited public companies from arranging or extending credit to 
their executive officers or directors.73 Adopted with little discussion and late in the 
process of drafting SOX,74 it did not address such obvious issues as travel advances, 
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 For evidence in support of a strong internal controls audit requirement, see Robert Prentice, 
Sarbanes-Oxley:  The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 703 
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relocation and retention loans, and broker-assisted cashless stock option exercises. Thus, 
Section 402 provides some support for the Romano critique that post-crash reform 
legislation can be overbroad and can disrupt legitimate business practices and objectives. 
What she ignores, however, is that it did not last long. 
 Despite Professor Romano’s views that executive loans were a matter of “settled 
state law” and had not generated “scholarly controversy,”75 the empirical evidence 
actually seems to indicate that such loans resulted in stealth compensation and were 
associated with both higher rates of financial misstatement and lower industry-adjusted 
returns.76 Further, although Professor Romano defends executive loans as leading to 
greater stock ownership and thus a better alignment of interests between corporate 
management and shareholders, several studies question this linkage (partly because the 
stock so acquired could be immediately sold) and in any event find that such loans may 
have induced managers to pursue high-risk corporate investment policies.77 
 Of course, what moved Congress in adopting SOX was not the empirical studies 
or the economic arguments, but the anecdotal evidence of extreme abuse:  Bernie Ebbers, 
CEO of WorldCom, borrowed $408 million from his company (and could ultimately 
repay none of it); Ken Lay, CEO of Enron, received $70 million in loans from Enron (as 
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 This evidence is concisely summarized by Professors Prentice and Spence. See Prentice and 
Spense, supra note 7, 1894 to 1895. See also, Kathleen M. Kahle & Kuldeep Shastri, Executive 
Loans, 39 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 791, 794-95 (2004); Charles Cullinan et al., A Test of 
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opposed to only $67 million in compensation); and Dennis Kozlowski, CEO of Tyco, 
borrowed approximately $270 million (which he largely used to purchase personal assets 
and real estate, rather than stock).78 As of the time that Congress enacted SOX in 2002, 
the average cash loan disclosed by those public companies that disclosed loans to 
executives was $11 million, and the total insider indebtedness for such companies was 
$4.5 billion.79 Worse yet, many of these executive loans were secured by only the stock 
itself; thus, if the stock price dropped, the board faced the choice of lending additional 
amounts to the executives or watching them sell their stock and drive down the 
company’s stock price.80 
 The bottom line then is that Congress had legitimate justifications for seeking to 
curb executive loans, but arguably did so clumsily and in an overbroad fashion. What 
happened next? The real surprise in the aftermath to Section 402 is that the SEC did 
virtually nothing. Instead, a coalition of some 25 major law firms drafted and publicly 
released a memorandum explaining how they would interpret Section 402,81 and the SEC 
quietly acquiesced. Many of the positions taken in this memorandum were quite 
reasonable, while others were more questionable (and almost certainly would not have 
been proposed in an SEC release). More important than the particular positions taken is 
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the fact that the bar simply replaced the SEC as the authoritative interpreter of the 
statute’s meaning. This example shows the Regulatory Sine Curve on steroids. 
 Why did the SEC behave so passively? One reason may have been that the 
corporate power to make loans to executives is usually governed by state law, and the 
SEC may not have felt comfortable invading Delaware’s territory. More likely, however, 
is a second explanation:  the SEC is a lawyer-dominated agency that does not want to 
become involved in a confrontation with the elite law firms of the private bar. Once those 
firms had taken a collective position, the confrontation would have been personal and 
even bruising if the SEC had rejected their interpretation (on which advice their clients 
were presumably relying). Here, we need to take into account the much discussed 
“revolving door” phenomenon under which SEC staffers join the Commission for a brief 
tour of duty before returning to positions on Wall Street or in the private bar. Given such 
career expectations, SEC staffers may be far more anxious about confronting the bar than 
any other interest group. 
 Still, the result was that the SEC allowed the bar to dictate the interpretation of a 
statutory provision in a manner that closely circumscribed what Congress had broadly, if 
clumsily, forbidden. The result was that a legislative “Thou Shall Not” was converted 
into a much weaker administrative “Thou generally should not . . .” Interestingly, in the 
time since the 25 law firm memorandum was adopted, the SEC has – with one exception 
– never brought an enforcement proceeding to contest an executive loan.82 One suspects 
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that the opportunities were there for enforcement actions if the SEC had been willing to 
pursue them. 
 C.  Attorneys As Whistle Blowers and Section 307. Section 307 of SOX 
instructed the SEC to adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of public 
companies. This provision was adopted with considerable fanfare by Senators who noted 
that lawyers were always “present at the scene of the crime” when securities frauds 
occurred.83 The Commission responded by adopting its “Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the 
Representation of an Issuer” with even greater fanfare in 2003.84 Under it, attorneys have 
an obligation to report material violations of federal or state securities laws, or breaches 
of fiduciary duty, to the issuer’s chief legal officer or to its chief executive officer.85 If the 
                                                                                                                                                 
approval) plus the fact that the officers acknowledged their awareness of SOX’s prohibition on 
executive loans (but did not consult counsel) may explain why the SEC made an exception and 
sued in this case and not in others (at least to date). 
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 The co-sponsors of Section 307 (“Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys”) were 
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transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the documents involved in that 
procedure.” 
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issuer still fails to take action, the lawyer may be required to report further to the 
company’s audit committee.86 Under some limited circumstances, the lawyer is even 
permitted (but not required) to disclose a material violation of law directly to the SEC.87 
 Aspirational as SEC Standards of Professional Conduct are, they have been 
followed by total silence on the enforcement front. Despite numerous instances in which 
lawyers were clearly aware of executive misconduct – and both the stock option 
backdating scandal and the mutual fund market timing scandal followed the adoption of 
these standards and presented instances in which attorneys were deeply implicated in 
misconduct involving violations of the federal securities laws – the SEC appears never to 
have charged an attorney representing a public corporation with violating this rule. To be 
sure, lawyers have been indicted for securities fraud and insider trading and civilly sued 
by the SEC, but these cases usually involve egregious self-dealing. The lesser remedy of 
asserting a professional conduct violation has simply not been used by the SEC. 
 Why not? Sanctioning attorneys for failure to report violations up the ladder 
within the corporate structure would again place the SEC in a position of high conflict 
with the bar. In contrast to prosecutions of attorneys for insider trading or other scienter-
based offenses, the SEC’s enforcement of reporting rules would reach attorneys who 
acted only negligently and or who declined to act (without in either case any clear 
element of self-dealing).  
                                                                                                                                                 
“becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, 
employee or agent of the issuer” to “report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . 
forthwith.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b). 
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 The SEC has long (and perhaps unwisely) resisted entering this zone, based on the 
overbroad rationale that to discipline attorneys for negligence or inaction would chill the 
attorney/client relationship and might dissuade clients from seeking legal advice.88 A 
recent case exemplifies the SEC’s continuing reluctance to engage in non-scienter based 
enforcement actions against attorneys. In In the Matter of Scott G. Monson,89 the SEC’s 
staff brought a cease and desist proceeding against a general counsel of a publicly held 
broker-dealer, who had allegedly facilitated late trading by that broker-dealer on behalf of 
its clients in over 600 mutual funds in violation of a very explicit and well-known 
Investment Company Act rule.90 The attorney had drafted an agreement pursuant to 
which the broker-dealer’s clients were authorized to engage in “late trading,” but the 
SEC’s staff did not allege that the attorney either knew that late trading violated the 
securities laws or that late trading was occurring. Noting that it had long avoided bringing 
cases against an attorney on the theory that the attorney “departed from professional 
standards of competence in rendering private legal advice to their clients,”91 the 
Commission explained that such restraint was necessary to avoid “encroachment by the 
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Commission on regulation of private attorney conduct historically performed by the 
states; interference with lawyers’ ability to provide unbiased, independent legal advice 
regarding the securities laws, and chilled advocacy on behalf of clients in proceedings 
before the Commission.”92 On this basis, the Commission therefore affirmed dismissal of 
the Enforcement Division’s complaint. 
 Arguably, these concerns are overblown when applied to an attorney who drafts 
an agreement expressly authorizing clearly unlawful conduct. Late trading is not a gray 
offense. More importantly, such an explanation – that the Commission will not normally 
proceed against professionals absent evidence of scienter – virtually implies that the 
Commission will not seriously enforce Section 307. Thus, it should not be surprising that 
Section 307 seems to have been abandoned by the Commission. As with its refusal to 
enforce the executive loan prohibition, the Commission seems unwilling to enter areas 
where it might either infringe on state regulation or encounter resistance from the bar. 
The consequence is that clear Congressional pronouncements are watered down or 
abandoned, and the rationale is basically the same rationale advocated by critics such as 
Professors Romano and Bainbridge:  namely, that federal agencies should not “encroach” 
upon areas traditionally relegated to state regulation. 
 Possibly, this explanation for equivocal SEC enforcement in the case of the 
financial industry is too narrow. Some federal courts have expressed concern that the 
SEC is too easily satisfied with symbolic, but hollow, victories and too apprehensive 
about the prospect of a litigation defeat in truly contested litigation to take on a major 





opponent. That was the thrust of Judge Rakoff’s recent Bank of America decision.93 For 
present purposes, it is not necessary to select the best explanation to reach the conclusion 
that equivocal enforcement by the SEC in cases involving major players in the financial 
industry has long been the pattern, and that pattern does not seem likely to change 
markedly in the near future. 
 D.  An Evaluation. The Tea Party critics of both SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act 
argue that, because “reform” legislation is rushed and hastily framed, the policy 
formulation is distorted by “suspect policy entrepreneurs” who “hijack the legislative 
process to advance a long-standing political agenda.”94 Brief as this review of SOX has 
been, it should make clear that “suspect policy entrepreneurs” did not play a major role in 
adopting or expanding SOX’s most controversial provision, Section 404. Nor is the 
meaning of “suspect policy entrepreneur” analytically clear or helpful. Many interest 
groups attempt to influence legislation and regulation (and business interest groups are 
particularly active). Why investor-oriented groups (such as public pension funds) are 
“suspect,” while groups favoring the status quo (such as business interest groups) are not 
considered equally “suspect” has not been adequately explained by these critics. 
 As next explained, the same critique has been directed at the Dodd-Frank Act.95 
Once again, it has only limited explanatory power. Even if it were the case that investor-
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oriented groups (such as pension funds and unions) are more active politically in the 
period following a crash, it remains unclear why their activity is “suspect,” while the far 
better funded political activity of business interest groups in seeking to repeal or curtail 
such legislation after normalcy returns is not.  
Part III.  The Dodd-Frank Act:  Premises and Policy Options 
 In 2008, Congress saw the nation’s largest financial institutions race like 
lemmings over the cliff and into insolvency. Why did they all become insolvent at once? 
Three credible scenarios have been offered by a variety of commentators. Each seems 
correct in part, and each motivated the legislative effort that produced the Dodd-Frank 
Act: 
 A.  Moral Hazard:  “Executive Compensation Caused the Crash.”  Because a 
rapid shift towards incentive-based compensation at financial institutions focused senior 
management on short-term results, longer-term risks were ignored or underweighed.96 
For example, if the executives in charge of asset-backed securitizations at a financial 
institution could make $100 million in bonuses in a single year if sufficient deals closed 
that year, such expected compensation could easily produce a “damn-the-torpedoes,-full-
speed-ahead” approach to risk taking. Indeed, why should such executives worry at all 
about the longer-term risks to their bank? Excessive compensation thus led to moral 
hazard. Inevitably, such a diagnosis leads to proposals to restrict executive compensation. 
But how and by whom? Here, the devil is in the details. Once we descend into the details 
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in the implementation process, the special interests and their lobbyists hold all the 
advantages. 
 2.  Because Creditors Believed That “Too Big to Fail” (“TBTF”) Banks Would 
Always Be Bailed Out, They Advanced Funds Too Cheaply and Allowed Banks to 
Become Overleveraged. Economists generally agree that an implicit Governmental 
subsidy for TBTF banks arose because the market assumed that such institutions would 
be bailed out. Such an implicit guarantee of their solvency leads investors to lend more 
cheaply to TBTF banks in comparison to smaller banks.97 The larger the bank, the 
cheaper it could borrow, in part because all assumed that the government would not allow 
the bank to fail. Seeing this subsidy, the shareholders and managers of such financial 
institutions rationally exploited it by taking on excessive debt and leverage. In effect, the 
banking system was encouraged to risk a solvency crisis because all market participants 
believed that the Government would have to bail it out. From this perspective, the core 
evil is the implicit subsidy for TBTF banks through cheaper borrowing costs, and the 
obvious economic answer is to tax this externality and cancel this subsidy. But 
eliminating subsidies and taxing externalities means making banks less profitable, and 
any such program will be predictably fought by the industry at every possible level – 
usually with the counterargument that imposing higher costs on TBTF banks will mean 
reduced employment and lending. 
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 3.  Bounded Rationality:  Cognitive Limitations, Conflicts of Interest, and a Lack 
of Transparency Induced Market Participants to Repress Recognition of the Problems 
Overtaking The Market. AIG provides the paradigm of this problem.98 By 2008, most 
major financial institutions had come to rely, directly or indirectly, on credit default 
swaps issued (or backstopped) by AIG to hedge these institutions’ exposure to financial 
risks.99 Had AIG’s aggregate contingent liability on credit default swaps been publicly 
recognized, many would have recognized that AIG alone could not insure them against 
an exposure of this magnitude. Instead, even if the market’s extraordinary dependence on 
AIG was dimly perceived, market participants were not forced to admit that the Emperor 
had no clothes. Instead, the problem was collectively repressed, which occurred to a 
considerable degree because the credit default swap market was itself opaque. Often for 
self-interested reasons (again involving executive compensation), financial managers 
persisted in maintaining highly vulnerable portfolios and remaining exposed to enormous 
risk, relying on an illusory form of insurance.  
 So what is the appropriate answer to this recurring tendency? If a stubborn refusal 
to recognize inconvenient truths is the problem, the obvious policy reform is greater 
transparency:  require OTC derivatives to be traded over exchanges and through 
clearinghouses, and it will be less possible for one actor to assume AIG’s position as the 
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counterparty for the entire market. As will be seen, the Dodd-Frank Act moves in this 
direction – equivocally and in a manner dependent on still pending implementation. 
 In response to all these perceived causes of the 2008 crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act 
pursued several strategies, broadly delegating authority to administrative agencies to fill 
in the details. First, in response to the initial hypothesis that excessive compensation 
induced excessive risk-taking, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted two somewhat inconsistent 
strategies. On one hand, it sided with traditional corporate governance reformers, 
enacting much of their standard agenda:  access to the proxy statement, “say on pay” 
advisory shareholder votes, and the elimination of broker votes. On the other hand, the 
Dodd-Frank Act gave financial regulators a broad paternalistic power to restrict executive 
compensation. As will be seen, with the return of “normalcy,” courts have struck down 
some of the corporate governance reforms (and others are in jeopardy).100 Meanwhile, 
regulators are quietly downsizing the restrictions authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act on 
executive compensation.101 
 With respect to the second diagnosis that the “too big to fail” subsidy for banks 
induced the excessive leverage that underlay the 2008 crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act took 
elaborate steps to restrict federal lending to large financial institutions, except when they 
are being liquidated. The Dodd-Frank Act’s goal was to signal that there would be no 
more bailouts, and hence creditors should not lend to TBTF banks on the same 
discounted terms. Yet, liquidity crises are endemic to banking, and whether the Dodd-
Frank Act resolves or aggravates the “TBTF problem” is debatable. All that is clear is 
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that, post-2008, the U.S. banking industry has become even more consolidated (as the 
survivors acquired those institutions that failed), and the failure of a TBTF bank would be 
even more catastrophic. Perhaps, as many suspect, financial regulators can still outflank 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s restrictions and find ways to bail out a failing bank. But, if so, the 
implicit subsidy has not been ended and the potential for another systemic risk crisis 
remains latent beneath the surface of reform. 
 Finally, looking at the AIG paradigm, Congress decided to shift the trading of 
over-the-counter derivatives to exchanges and require the use of clearinghouses. But 
Congress stopped short of deciding how far to push this reform and instead delegated the 
issue (subject to some substantial exemptions to financial regulators). 
 This article does not portray the Dodd-Frank Act as “perfect” legislation. Like 
much “reform” legislation, it is a potpourri of different provisions, some of which may be 
inconsistent or poorly conceived. That is inevitable in the real world when Congress must 
act under time pressure and faces the need to satisfy many constituencies. Thus, this 
article focuses more on the incompleteness of the Dodd-Frank Act, the continuing need 
for detailed implementation, and the erosive impact of the Regulatory Sine Curve on that 
process. It will focus primarily on three areas:  (1) executive compensation; (2) the “too 
big to fail” problem and proposed reforms to restrain risk-taking by TBTF banks, and (3) 
the over-the-counter derivatives area (where the AIG bailout provided the motivating 
force for Congress). Although it will agree that the Dodd-Frank Act was in some respects 
imperfectly designed, the greater problem is that it relies on administrative 
implementation that can be too easily frustrated. 
 A. Executive Compensation and Shareholder Pressure 
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 The conventional story of the 2008 crisis—as best told by Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk and his coauthors102—focuses on the perverse influences created by executive 
compensation formulas.  They argue not only that executive pay packages were 
excessively focused on short-term results, but that because senior executives’ 
compensation packages were closely tied to highly levered bets on the value of the banks’ 
assets, such executives shared in any shareholder gains but were insulated from 
shareholder losses.103  Hence, they could focus on the upside and ignore the downside of 
any risky strategy.  The result, they argue, is a classic moral hazard problem. 
 To corroborate their claim, Bebchuk and his coauthors have collected data 
showing that senior managers appeared to have profited handsomely even when 
shareholders lost virtually everything.  Examining the failures of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman, they find that the top five executives at each firm cashed out extraordinary 
amounts of performance-based compensation during the 2000–2008 period.  Specifically, 
they estimate that these top five management teams derived $1.4 billion and $1 billion, 
respectively, from cash bonuses and equity sales during this period.104  These amounts 
substantially exceeded the same executives’ stock holdings at the beginning of the period.  
If managers win when shareholders lose, this finding would seem to confirm Bebchuk’s 
moral hazard diagnosis. 
 Their research has not, however, gone unchallenged.  In particular, Rene Stulz has 
coauthored several papers that dispute this thesis that the executive compensation 
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formulas for senior executives at financial institutions drove the 2008 crisis by creating 
an incentive to accept excessive risk.105  In one paper, he and a coauthor find evidence 
that those banks with chief executive officers (CEOs) whose incentives were better 
aligned with their shareholders actually performed worse during the crisis.106  They 
suggest that “CEOs with better incentives to maximize shareholder wealth took risks that 
other CEOs did not.”107  Nor do they find that bank CEOs reduced their stock holdings 
prior to 2008; hence, they suffered large wealth losses along with the shareholders.108  In 
short, little evidence supports the claim that shareholders were being overreached by their 
CEOs. 
 In another study, Stulz and a coauthor find that banks with “shareholder-friendly” 
corporate governance performed worse during the 2008 crisis.109  Indeed, banks that the 
market had favored in 2006 had especially poor returns during the crisis.110  In other 
words, financial institutions that led the market in 2006 encountered disaster in 2008.  In 
contrast, financial institutions that had seemed stodgy and unresponsive to shareholder 
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 Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit 
Crisis?  A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation (European 
Corporate Governance Inst., Fischer College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-12, 
(2009)), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1433502; Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. 
Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (The Ohio State Univ. Fisher College of 
Business, Working Paper No. 2009-03-13, 2009), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859. 
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 See Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 105, at 1–2 (arguing that most plausible explanation for 
these findings is that CEOs “took actions that they believed the market would welcome,” but 
“[e]x post, these actions were costly to their banks”). 
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 Id. at 26. 
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 Id. at 2, 4. 
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 Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 102, at 3. 
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 Id. at 2.  Banks that performed in the worst quartile of performance during the 2008 crisis had 
average returns of -87.44% during the crisis, but an average return of +33.07% in 2006.  The best 
performing banks during the crisis had average returns of -16.58% during the crisis, but only 
average returns of +7.80% in 2006.  Id. at 14. 
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desires in 2006 experienced the least losses in 2008.  Such findings are at least consistent 
with the view that shareholder pressure led managers to take on higher leverage and 
accept greater risk in the boom years—with catastrophic consequences later in 2008.  
Shareholders in effect opted for a financial roller coaster, and the firms they controlled 
soared to record peaks and plunged to deep valleys in rapid succession. 
 Other studies by different teams of researchers have reached similar conclusions.  
Gropp and Köhler find that “owner controlled” banks had higher profits in the years 
before the 2008 crisis in comparison to “manager controlled” banks, but experienced 
larger losses and were more likely to require governmental assistance during the 2008 
crisis.111  Using a sample of 296 firms from thirty countries, Erkens, Hung, and Matos 
show that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership 
experienced worse stock returns during the 2007–2008 crisis.112  Specifically, they found 
that firms with higher institutional ownership took “greater risk in their investment 
policies before the onset of the crisis.”113  Such evidence suggests that even if managers 
would prefer to avoid high risk and leverage, their preferences can be overridden by 
shareholders, and that institutional investors in particular can compel firms to accept 
greater risk and thus cause them to suffer worse losses in a crisis. 
 The point here is not that Professor Bebchuk and his coauthors are wrong. They 
argue that the pay formulas used to compensate senior management at banks gave them 
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an excessive incentive to accept risk.  But such an increased incentive could be exactly 
what shareholders wanted.  Shareholders have long used executive compensation to align 
managerial preferences with their own, and institutional investors certainly understand 
that managers are undiversified and thus risk averse about corporate insolvency. Being 
diversified and having limited liability, shareholders do not suffer as much as managers 
from a bankruptcy. To “correct” the managerial tendency toward risk aversion, 
shareholders might have been willing to accept even imperfect compensation formulas to 
seduce managers into accepting increased risk.  Thus, both sides in this debate could have 
valid points.  Bebchuk and company appear correct in arguing that compensation 
formulas create excessive incentives for bank managers to engage in risky activities, and 
Stulz and others can legitimately interpret their own data to mean that shareholder-
controlled firms accept higher risk and hence are more prone to failure in a crisis than 
firms in which managers are free to enjoy the quiet life (and so avoid risk).  Rather than 
managers overreaching shareholders, it looks instead as if these compensation formulas 
crudely aligned managerial and shareholder interests, but created a socially excessive 
incentive for risk-taking. Under this synthesis, shareholders, as principals, simply found 
ways to contract with managers, as their agents, to accept greater risk through lucrative 
compensation formulas. 
 But that only brings us back to the centrality of shareholder pressure and the gap 
in bank governance between what is privately optimal and what is socially optimal.  
Arguably, shareholders of financial institutions were willing to accept high leverage and 
risk, not simply because they were diversified, but because they believed that (1) major 
banks were “too big to fail,” and (2) the implicit reduction in interest expense charged to 
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“too big to fail” banks created an opportunity for “cheap” capital that could not be 
spurned.  Based on these expectations, shareholders of major financial institutions could 
rationally pressure management to accept more risk than shareholders might consider 
advisable at industrial corporations. 
 At this point, it is necessary to disaggregate shareholders.  Individual shareholders 
may sometimes also be risk averse and disinclined to pressure management toward 
greater risk and leverage, but they are a decreasing minority of all shareholders.114  Yet, 
not only do institutional investors own a majority of the equity in U.S. public 
corporations, but their level of ownership rises to 73% when we focus on the top 1,000 
U.S. corporations (among which large financial institutions easily rank).115  Mutual funds 
now represent the largest category of institutional owner (in terms of equity holdings).116  
Their rise is important because, in comparison to pension funds, mutual funds more 
actively compete for the investor’s favor, and their recent investment returns are likely to 
heavily influence this competition.  As a result, they tend to be more proactive investors. 
 Historically, pension funds were largely indexed investors, holding large 
portfolios that mimicked the broader market.  Thus, they were disinclined to become 
involved in individual corporate governance disputes, because they could not profit 
                                                 
114
 Recent estimates find retail (or individual) shareholders own only roughly 25% of the stock in 
publicly traded firms, with the balance being owned by institutional investors and foreign 
investors (who are also largely institutions).  Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public:  Institutional 
Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 245, 262 tbl.1 (2009).  Since 
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 See Tonello and Rabimov, supra note 114, at 27 chart 14 (showing this percentage to have 
been 76.4% in 2007 and 73% in 2009).  
116
 Id. at 24–26 & tbl.12 (showing mutual funds held 20.9% of the total equity U.S. market in 
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significantly from them.117  But this is changing.  Increasingly, pension funds are 
investing their stock portfolios in hedge funds to obtain returns superior to simple 
indexing.118  In turn, these hedge funds pursue proactive strategies, and one of their 
favorite targets is the underleveraged firm.119 
 The shareholders’ preference for leverage is complemented (and to a degree made 
possible) by the creditors’ continuing expectation that they will be protected in a 
federally-assisted rescue of a failing financial institution.  When faced with a failing 
bank, the federal government has traditionally arranged shotgun marriages through 
mergers (with federal assumption of at least some of the failing firm’s liabilities).120  This 
was the strategy followed to rescue Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia during 
the 2008 crisis.  Under this standard pattern, even if the shareholders of the failed bank 
were not protected, its creditors were.  Thus, the implicit subsidy in interest rates remains 
and should logically continue to motivate shareholders to seek to exploit “cheap” 
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 For the standard observation that many institutional investors hold too large a portfolio to have 
much interest in firm-specific corporate governance, see, e.g., Robert Cyran, Beware:  Activists 
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financing at the cost of excessive leverage. 
 From this perspective, it seems ironically counter-productive that the Dodd-Frank 
Act actually sought to increase the ability of shareholders to pressure managers, because 
such shareholder pressure would predictably often seek to compel managers to increase 
leverage and accept greater risk. Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt 
rules giving shareholders “access to the proxy statement,”121 enabling dissidents to mount 
campaigns for minority seats on the board without having to undertake costly proxy 
fights.  The SEC responded to this invitation by quickly adopting new Rule 14a-11, 
which authorizes dissident shareholders to place their nominees on the corporate board at 
low cost.122  Rule 14a-11 could be a desirable counterweight to entrenched managerial 
power in much of Corporate America, but again financial institutions are a special case.  
Given the natural tension between the social interest in prudent bank regulation and the 
shareholder interest in profit maximization through higher leverage, corporate 
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 Section 971 (“Proxy Access”) of the Dodd-Frank Act added a new § 14(a)(2) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 that authorizes the SEC to adopt rules under which dissident shareholders 
may nominate candidates for the board of directors of a public company and include their 
nominees in the issuer’s own proxy statement (thereby permitting these insurgents to economize 
on the costs of conducting a proxy fight).  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1915 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n). 
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 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange 
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(Sept. 16, 2010).  Specifically, if certain conditions are satisfied, the new rule will permit 
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those nominated by the Board’s nominating committee.  Effectively, this procedure would have 
spared the insurgents much of the costs of a proxy contest.   
 The business community challenged the SEC’s new “proxy access” rule and invalidated 
it in court. See Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(invalidating Rule 14a-11 for failure to “adequately assess the economic effects” of the rule). The 
impact of this case and the weapon it gives business interests to challenge “reform” legislation is 
assessed infra in the text and notes at notes 148 to 153. 
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governance reforms that enhance shareholder power may at the same time weaken 
regulatory control over financial institutions.  
 Still, if the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act made a misjudgment in seeking to use 
shareholders to restrain corporate risk-taking, it was probably a minor error. Close 
students of the proxy rules doubt that the “proxy access” rule would have significantly 
altered the corporate governance landscape or that the most powerful activists (i.e., hedge 
funds) would have used it.123 
 In fairness to Congress, the Dodd-Frank Act did not rely exclusively on corporate 
governance reforms to restrict executive compensation. Rather than depending 
exclusively on the fox to guard the executive compensation henhouse, Congress also 
enacted a very paternalistic Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized 
regulators to prohibit excessive incentive-based compensation at “covered financial 
institutions” that “could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial 
institution.”124 This was a more direct route to reform, but, as will be seen, financial 
regulators appear to be backing away from implementing Section 956 effectively. 
 B.  Systemic Risk and the “Too Big to Fail” Problem 
 The overriding goal of Dodd-Frank Act was to reduce systemic risk. But dealing 
with systemic risk requires that we first understand it. Although there is no universally 
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accepted definition of the term,125 most agree that it has three faces: 
(1) A financial institution can simply be “too big to fail.” A Citigroup 
probably is, but Lehman was perceived not to be. 
(2) An institution can be “too connected to fail,” largely as the result of 
the increased use of over-the-counter derivatives (including credit 
default swaps). As a result, the failure of one can imply the eventual 
failure of its counterparties in a cascade of falling financial dominoes. 
This scenario explains the Government’s bailout of AIG, upon whom 
all other major financial institutions had relied for protection. 
(3) Financial institutions can also be too risk correlated to fail, with the 
result that the failure of one implies intense stress for the others. 
Although uncorrelated risk can be managed through policies such as 
diversification, risks that are correlated cannot be similarly resolved or 
protected against.  
This last face of systemic risk – risk correlation – is probably the least understood and 
most dangerous. Because of market pressures (fueled again in part by shareholders 
willing to accept risk), large financial institutions are inclined to adopt similar investment 
and strategic policies (or face a stock market penalty for their refusal). Thus, in the late 
1990s, large financial institutions began aggressively to develop their asset-backed 
securitization business, because it appeared to offer the highest return on their capital. 
Assume next that one such institution encounters a liquidity crisis (as Bear Stearns did in 
early 2008) and must sell illiquid assets (such as interests in asset-backed securitizations) 
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into a thin market. Prices fall quickly throughout this market, and other financial 
institutions are as a result forced to write down their investments in similar assets. 
Moreover, short sellers and others realize that trouble at one financial institution signals 
distress at other similar institutions and compound the market pressure. This crisis then 
feeds on itself, as all these banks begin to sell the same now disfavored investments into 
the same, even thinner market. 
 How can one design an intelligent policy that reduces systemic risk, given the 
likelihood that market and shareholder pressures will lead financial institutions to follow 
the herd and pursue similar investment policies? Among the obvious options are:  
 (a) Higher Equity Capital Requirements. Such a strategy makes sense, but 
precisely because it will reduce leverage and thus bank profitability, it will be quietly 
resisted by banks. A variant on this general technique is to employ “contingent capital” – 
namely, a debt security that automatically converts by its terms into an equity security 
when the institution encounters a defined level of economic stress.126 
 (b) A Private, Industry-Funded Insurance System. Such an insurance system is 
essentially what the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) manages, and it has 
long been the preferred policy of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”). Essentially, it 
replaces a public bailout with a private industry bailout, and forces the banking industry 
to internalize the costs of higher leverage. Put differently, this approach taxes the 
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externality by imposing a charge on the industry to prefund such an insurance fund; this 
offsets the externality that arises when TBTF banks are able to borrow funds too cheaply 
because of an expected governmental guarantee.127 
 (c) Reducing Risk Through Prophylactic Rules. A third approach is to reduce the 
risk level of TBTF banks by denying them authority to engage in certain higher risk 
activities. As discussed later, the “Volcker Rule,” which Dodd-Frank partially adopted, 
intends such a result by prohibiting large banks from engaging in proprietary trading or 
running hedge funds. Similarly, the now repealed Glass-Steagall Act separated 
investment banking from commercial banking in order to protect the latter institutions. 
 Dodd-Frank mandates only the last of these steps, through a provision popularly 
known as “the Volcker Rule.”128 It will be discussed shortly, but it is the primary 
exception to the generally accurate generalization that the Dodd-Frank Act did not 
mandate stricter standards on TBTF banks (but only authorized regulators to do so). For 
example, although Dodd-Frank authorizes the Federal Reserve to impose higher and 
more restrictive standards with regard to bank capital and leverage, it did not direct any 
specific such action and instead leaves these issues to the discretion of the Federal 
Reserve Board (“FRB”) and a new body called the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”).129 At earlier stages in the Dodd-Frank legislation, both the House and Senate 
versions of the Act did contain important provisions mandating a private industry 
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insurance fund (modeled after the FDIC), but these provisions were ultimately deleted at 
the conference stage. Why? Populist anger at the costly bailout of the banks 
(compounded by resentment over continued high executive compensation in the financial 
industry) made any “bailout” proposal politically unacceptable. In addition, some feared 
that the existence of such a fund would perpetuate a moral hazard problem, as creditors 
would feel protected and continue to lend at a discount. 
 Instead, Congress’s attention in Dodd-Frank was chiefly directed at prohibiting 
future public bailouts by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC. To this end, regulators were 
stripped of their former authority to advance funds to major financial institutions facing a 
liquidity crisis.130  Yet, it is still not clear that the market really believes that any future 
administration could truly tolerate a major bank failure, and many suspect that some 
means would be found to evade statutory obstacles in a major crisis. A future 
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 Section 1101(a)(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act restricts the Federal Reserve Board’s former 
authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to make emergency loans to a failing 
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receivership under section 204(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, section 212(a) (“No Other Funding”) 
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continue to arrange mergers or “purchases and assumptions.”   
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Administration might also be unwilling to liquidate a failing financial institution if its 
liquidation would be read politically as a failure of oversight on its part.  Even among 
experienced practitioners, uncertainty surrounds what will actually happen the next time a 
major liquidity crisis erupts and a significant financial institution nears insolvency.131  
Possibly, the FDIC could liquidate the bank, but still spare its creditors by forming a 
“bridge company” whose debts would be assumed or guaranteed by it.132 As a result, the 
market may still consider the creditors of large banks to be protected from failure, and 
hence the “too big to fail” subsidy may continue, even if to a reduced degree. 
 Rightly or wrongly, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to cut off the possibility of central 
bank emergency funding for a bank in distress in order (in part) to end the idea that a 
bank can be “too big to fail.” This reverses a policy followed by most central banks since 
at least the late 18th Century, when Walter Bagehot defined the role of the central banker 
as that of serving as the “lender of last resort.”133 Although a policy of ending emergency 
funding is at least a relevant response to the problem of the TBTF subsidy, it is a 
Draconian policy that represents a huge gamble. 
 Put simply, the core problem is that banks are inherently fragile. They (and 
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similar financial institutions) are subject to a fundamental mismatch between the short-
term character of their liabilities and the longer-term character of their assets.134  
Depositors expect and receive high liquidity, while borrowers expect to repay their loans 
over a longer, multiyear period.  In good times, banks profit from this “maturity 
transformation”, realizing the spread between the lower rate paid depositors and the 
higher rate charged borrowers.  But, in bad times, banks have been classically subject to 
“runs” when depositor confidence is shaken.135 
 This mismatch is compounded by the practical necessity for a financial institution 
of using leverage.  Arguably, only banks that employ high leverage can realize the full 
economies of scale that are inherent to the banking business.  The more that a bank 
borrows and lends, the more that it can profit on its fixed costs. 
 Although investment banks are different from commercial banks in that they do 
not have depositors, they are equally subject to the same mismatch of short-term 
liabilities and long-term assets, because typically they finance their operations with short-
term, often overnight borrowings in the “repo” market.136  Thus, when the market 
suspects that a financial institution is subject to a risk of insolvency, short-term creditors 
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may stage their own bank “run” by refusing to renew short-term credit lines or vastly 
increasing the interest rate.  This functional equivalent to a “run” by depositors appears to 
have happened not only at Bear Stearns and Lehman, but across the banking system in 
2008.137  Yale Economics Professor Gary Gorton has argued that the 2008 panic was 
different from most panics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in that it was a 
“wholesale” panic, not a “retail” panic, because the market suddenly learned that the 
banking system as a whole had become insolvent.138 
 This point about the “wholesale” character of the crisis explains why reforms such 
as private, industry-funded bailout funds are unlikely to prove adequate by themselves. 
Insurance can work to avert a crisis when a small percentage of the industry may fail, but 
not when a plurality may all fail contemporaneously because of risk correlation.  A 
private insurance fund might be sufficient to bail out a Lehman (at most), but not the 
aggregate of Lehman, Citigroup, and Goldman, Sachs. To the extent that a systemic risk 
crisis is provoked by risk correlation, multiple contemporaneous failures become more 
likely that could dwarf such a fund. In 2009, much of the financial industry was 
threatened and the banking system effectively froze.139 
 The Dodd-Frank Act’s decision to withdraw traditional emergency lending 
authority from the FRB and the FDIC for solvent banks facing only liquidity crises and 
its failure to adopt any FDIC-like, prefunded private insurance bailout fund, may prove in 
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time to have been right or wrong, but they were certainly not the product of the “policy 
entrepreneurs” and activist investors that Professors Romano and Bainbridge accuse of 
“highjacking” reform legislation. Moreover, because these decisions were essentially 
negative ones that took authority away from (or did not extend authority to) financial 
regulators, they underscore the importance of the two affirmative steps that the Dodd-
Frank Act did take:  (1) It sought to reduce systemic risk at large financial institutions by 
adopting the Volcker Rule; (2) It authorized the FRB to adopt higher capital, liquidity 
and related prudential standards. 
 Thus, at the end of the day, the Dodd-Frank Act largely left everything up to the 
financial regulators, delegating them discretion but mandating relatively little. Such a 
strategy depends on whether effective implementation is possible in the current political 
environment, and there are substantial reasons to doubt that it is. 
C. The Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) Derivatives Market 
 
 The 2008 financial crisis crested when in rapid succession Lehman failed and 
AIG was bailed out. Lehman is the paradigm of the bank that arguably was “too big to 
fail,” but AIG’s story is more complex. It poses the problem of an opaque technology 
whose full impact was not clear. Potentially, AIG’s failure could have sunk far more 
counterparties than Lehman ever conceivably threatened. 
 In response to the AIG episode, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to bring transparency 
to the OTC market by mandating the use of clearinghouses, exchange trading of OTC 
derivatives, and trade reporting. This effort was entirely rational and may yet be 
successful, but it is very much in doubt. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes for 
the first time an integrated legal regime for the regulation of the derivatives market, 
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assigning security-based swaps to the SEC and other swaps to the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”).140 Although this division perpetuates the U.S. long-
standing preference for a multi-peaked regulatory structure, the two agencies seem to be 
operating in unison – at least for the time being. Both agencies are seeking to increase the 
standardization of swap agreements in order to facilitate their trading through a central 
clearinghouse. The key goal is to eliminate counterparty risk for dealers and investors by 
replacing the bilateral trading of OTC derivatives with trading through a centralized 
clearinghouse. 
 Yet inevitably, such a restructuring does not eliminate risk, but only shifts it. The 
new central clearinghouses will bear the counterparty risk, and the failure of any major 
clearinghouse could be an event that would trigger a major systemic risk crisis. Once 
again, systemic risk is being concentrated with the creation of another “TBTF” 
institution. 
 Because private mechanisms for dealing with counterparty risk clearly failed in 
2008 (and indeed many financial institutions did not require major dealers, including 
AIG, to post collateral to secure their trades until the advent of the crisis), the case for use 
of clearinghouses is strong, but not without problems. Critics of the idea believe that 
clearinghouses are inherently exposed to failure. They argue that clearinghouses will be 
bureaucratic institutions less able or willing to assess risk positions in credit default 
swaps because they will not be as motivated by profit opportunities as individual 
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dealers.141 Others make a related argument:  a meaningful reduction of counterparty risk 
in swap trading through multilateral netting of investment positions in a clearinghouse 
requires that the vast majority of the volume in swaps traded must clear through that 
clearinghouse.142 In effect, to work, the clearinghouse must gain a near monopoly. 
 But here politics intervened. The Dodd-Frank Act contains an important 
exemption – known as the “end user exemption” – which exempts from its mandatory 
clearing requirement for swaps any counterparty who (1) is not a “financial entity,” (2) 
uses the swap to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and (3) notifies the appropriate 
regulatory agency (SEC or CFTC) as to how it generally meets its financial obligations 
associated with entering into such non-cleared swaps.143 Politically, this was necessary to 
exempt major swap users who might have otherwise been able to block the legislation:  
for example, major airlines seeking to hedge the future cost of aviation fuel. Such “end 
users” did not wish to be subjected to the minimum capital and margin requirements that 
the Dodd-Frank Act imposed on swap dealers.144 The consequence is that much of the 
volume in swaps will not be cleared and will escape margin requirements. 
 The SEC and the CFTC have proposed a joint rule to distinguish the commercial 
“end user” from more speculative financial investors in swaps.145 Under it, much of swap 
trading will escape the collateral and capital rules that are intended to mitigate systemic 
risk. The two agencies cannot be faulted for obeying Congress, but politics has produced 
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a strange hybrid that could either reduce or exacerbate systemic risk. This vulnerability is 
compounded by a second difficulty:  non-standardized swap contracts cannot be easily 
cleared. Worse yet, forcing complex derivatives into clearinghouses increases the 
operational risk for the clearinghouse because it will be required to clear products that it 
cannot easily price (and thereby set appropriate margins).146 To the extent that 
clearinghouse members have a better more accurate understanding of these risks, they 
will possess asymmetric information and may be able to trade to their advantage and the 
clearinghouse’s disadvantage.147 Although swap dealers would have to share the costs of 
a clearinghouse failure, each has an incentive to trade against the clearinghouse in a way 
that in the aggregate increases the risk of systemic failure. 
 Part IV:  The Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 The foregoing section has argued that the Dodd-Frank Act is a skeletal structure 
that has few affirmative commands but rather is heavily dependent on administrative 
implementation. As noted earlier, the financial industry’s best opportunity to nullify 
costly regulation is often at the level of administrative implementation. Because (1) the 
administrative process is less visible and politically accountable, (2) some agencies (most 
notably the FRB) may be too closely aligned with the financial entities they are to 
regulate, or (3) the financial industry can both win concessions through negotiations and 
then challenge in court those regulations not otherwise watered down, the industry may 
win much at the implementation level that it could not achieve at the legislative level. In 
addition, the Regulatory Sine Curve concept discussed earlier suggests that regulatory 
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ardor wanes once the sense of emergency is lost. 
 Against that backdrop, this article will next survey the progress of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s implementation in three critical areas:  (1) the attempt to curb excessive 
executive compensation; (2) the effort to end the “TBTF problem” by restricting risky 
activities that may cause bank failure; and (3) the effort to move OTC trading out of the 
shadows and into the sunlight of greater transparency. It is still premature to evaluate 
implementation with respect to the last two objectives, but a fuller assessment is possible 
of the effort to curb executive compensation. 
 A.  Curbing Executive Compensation:  The Road Not Taken. A major goal of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was to reduce the danger of moral hazard by better relating executive 
compensation to long-term performance. The Dodd-Frank Act approached this goal by 
two distinct means, both of which have now been largely frustrated. Each will be 
examined separately. 
 1.  Proxy Access and Corporate Governance. As already noted, the Dodd-Frank 
Act instructed the SEC to use the standard inventory of corporate governance reform – 
proxy access, “say on pay,” and a restriction on broker voting – to make corporate 
managers more accountable to shareholders. As discussed above, this may have been an 
ill-advised tactic (at least in the context of large financial institutions where excessive 
leverage needs to be discouraged). But vastly overshadowing the significance of the 
SEC’s proxy access rule are the implications of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the 
Business Roundtable suit to invalidate that rule. The decision in Business Roundtable v. 
SEC148 casts a substantial cloud over the SEC’s ability to adopt other rules, even if not 
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related to corporate governance, in implementing the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 In adopting Rule 14a-11 (the proxy access rule), the Commission relied on 
Section 971 of Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized, but did not mandate, the Commission 
to adopt such a rule giving shareholders an alternative means by which to nominate and 
elect directors.149 Because the Commission had discretion, it was subject to Section 3(f) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires the Commission, when it 
determines if a rule is in the public interest, to “also consider, in addition to the protection 
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”150 On its face, this language has a relatively “soft” sound, mandating only 
consideration of these impacts, not that the Commission must determine that the interests 
of investor protection outweigh those of efficiency, competition and capital formation. 
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit has now several times invalidated SEC rules under this 
provision, finding that the Commission has a “statutory obligation to determine as best as 
it can the economic implications of the rule.”151 
 In fact, the SEC did consider several economic studies on the likely impact of 
encouraging the election of dissident candidates and expressly noted the limitations of 
these studies. In their lawsuit, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce 
asserted both that (1) “the Commission failed to appreciate the intensity with which 
issuers would oppose nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the probability that directors 
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would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support their own nominees,”152 
and (2) the Commission arbitrarily failed “to estimate the costs of solicitation and 
campaigning that companies would incur to oppose candidates nominated by 
shareholders. . . .”153 Thus, a rule basically intended to tilt the balance of advantage in 
corporate board elections in favor of dissident shareholders was invalidated because the 
Commission did not (or could not) estimate the costs of the hostile corporate reaction to 
such efforts. By analogy, this is equivalent to invalidating an Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) rule mandating that toxic wastes not be dumped into rivers and 
waterways because the EPA had not adequately estimated the costs to companies of 
alternative means of disposal.  
 Still, the relevant issue for this article is the decision’s impact on future SEC 
attempts to adopt rules under the Dodd-Frank Act. The critics of SEC attempts to 
“federalize” corporate law by mandating corporate governance practices will celebrate 
the Business Roundtable decision because it seems to require the Commission to consider 
the empirical studies that they feel were disregarded in the enactment of SOX. 
Presumably, the D.C. Circuit would not attempt to hold Congress to this same standard, 
but to the extent that Congress enacts legislation giving the SEC any discretion as to the 
means to be used, the SEC’s exercise of that discretion could be closely reviewed by the 
D.C. Circuit under the Section 3(f) standard. 
 This problem is not limited to SEC rules addressing corporate governance. 
Eventually, when the SEC adopts rules implementing the “Volcker Rule” (Section 619 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act) or mandating the use of clearinghouses or exchanges for the trading 
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of security-based swaps, some interest group or individual financial institutions will feel 
aggrieved and sue. The outcome of such litigation cannot be predicted today, but it is 
sufficiently threatening that an overworked and underfunded SEC may compromise its 
rules, watering them down, to avoid the risk of another humiliating decision from the 
D.C. Circuit. Although Congress could legislate its own standards without delegating the 
matter to administrative agencies, that would imply abandoning the contemporary 
administrative state and reliance on administrative expertise. Not since the New Deal has 
the prospect of judicial challenge to legislative supremacy loomed as large on the 
horizon. To be sure, Congress could curb the D.C. Circuit’s activism, but in the current 
polarized political environment such an effort seems unlikely. 
 2.  Section 956. Congress did not rely exclusively (or even primarily) on 
corporate governance reforms to curb excessive executive compensation. Section 956 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act broadly authorized financial regulators to limit excessive 
compensation, but financial regulators have been equivocal in using the powers it 
conferred on them. Somewhat vaguely, Section 956 instructed a “covered financial 
institution” to disclose to its respective regulator “the structure of all incentive-based 
compensation” paid to officers, directors and employees in order to enable the regulator 
to prohibit excessive incentive-based compensation “that could lead to material financial 
loss to the covered financial institution.”154  
 The issue was how broadly to construe this disclosure obligation. Although 
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Section 956 made clear that it was not requiring the disclosure of the individual 
executive’s compensation,155 regulators could have insisted on quantitative data about the 
aggregate incentive compensation paid by the firm and its distribution among employees 
and executives. What could such disclosure reveal that might be of material interest to 
investors? The following chart, taken from a study conducted by then New York 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo of the incentive compensation received in 2008 by 
employees of the original TARP recipient financial institutions, shows the disclosures 
that could have been mandated under Section 956 (but were not):156 
Selected TARP Recipients 2008 Bonus Compensation 
Institution 
Earnings / 









Bonus ≥ $1 
million 
Bank of America $4 billion $3.3 billion 28 172 
Citigroup, Inc. $(27.7 billion) $5.33 billion 124 738 
Goldman, Sachs Group $2.322 billion $4.823 billion 212 953 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. $5.6 billion $8.693 billion ≥ 200 1,626 
Merrill Lynch $(27.6 billion) $3.6 billion 149 696 
Morgan Stanley $1,707 billion $4.475 billion 101 428 
 
As this chart makes clear, even when financial institutions lost billions, they still paid out 
bonuses totaling in the billions to hundreds of employees (see Citigroup and Merrill 
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Lynch in the above chart). When the firm did profit, the bonus pool was often a multiple 
of earnings (see Goldman, J.P. Morgan, and Morgan Stanley’s in the above chart). 
Moreover, practices varied, thus making firm-specific disclosure more important. 
Reading the Cuomo data more closely, one finds the following number of employees 
receiving over $10 million in bonus compensation in 2008 at these firms:  Merrill Lynch 
(14); Morgan Stanley (10); J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (10); Goldman Sachs (6); Bank of 
America (4); Citigroup (3).157 In sum, the Cuomo data underscores three conclusions:  (1) 
the bonus culture persisted even in bad times; (2) bonus payments to executives often 
exceeded distributions to shareholders; and (3) some individuals received extraordinary 
incentive compensation that logically could cause a moral hazard problem. 
 Revealing as this information may be, disclosure pursuant to Section 956 will not 
yield anything remotely equivalent. This is because the major financial regulators have 
read Section 956 narrowly. The first interpretive problem posed by Section 956’s broad 
language involved identifying those persons whose behavior could inflict “material 
financial loss” on their institutions. Only incentive compensation to such persons was 
subject to regulation. Obviously, the bank’s janitor cannot ordinarily inflict a “material 
financial loss,” but the history of broker-dealer firms suggest that traders often can (as 
happened in recent memory at both Barings and Societe Generale). 
 The principal financial regulators responded in unison to this challenge in April, 
2011 with a joint set of rules that each adopted.158 In the case of “covered financial 
institutions” (meaning basically any financial institution with total consolidated assets of 
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$1 billion or more), these rules require an annual report that “describes the structure of 
the covered financial institution’s incentive based compensation arrangements . . . that is 
sufficient to allow an assessment of whether the structure or features of those 
arrangements provide or are likely to provide covered persons with excessive 
compensation, fees, or benefits to covered persons or could lead to material financial loss 
to the covered financial institution.”159 This is rather general and abstract language, and 
no specific data was required. For example, regulators might have followed Andrew 
Cuomo’s lead and required disclosure of the number of employees at a firm who received 
bonuses of over $1 million in the prior year (even if none were identified by name). 
Instead, the new rules do not require disclosure of quantitative data, but only a 
generalized narrative description. This seems likely to produce long-winded boilerplate 
from securities lawyers adept at covering the waterfront in opaque prose.  
 In the case of financial institutions with over $50 billion in total consolidated 
assets (i.e., the TBTF category), more was required by these regulations. Such institutions 
must provide a description of “incentive-based compensation policies and procedures” 
for two categories of persons:  (1) executive officers, and (2) such “other covered persons 
who the board of directors, or a committee thereof, of the covered financial institution has 
identified and determined . . . individually have the ability to expose the covered financial 
institution to possible losses that are substantial in relation to the covered institution’s 
size, capital or overall risk tolerance.”160 Again, this stops well short of revealing the full 
depth of the bonus culture at a firm, because many (potentially hundreds of employees) 
could receive incentive compensation in the million dollar range and yet be exempted 
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from disclosure because the board did not believe they could cause a “substantial loss” to 
the firm. 
 In short, only in the case of TBTF institutions do the rules require any specific 
disclosure or serious assessment of who could actually cause a substantial loss to the 
financial institution, but, even in these cases, the regulations still delegate to each covered 
financial institution the determination of who (beyond its executive officers) could 
expose it to such a “substantial loss.” This delegation is significant because only the 
covered persons so identified (and executive officers) become subject to additional 
substantive requirements. In the case of the executive officers of these TBTF institutions, 
the proposed rules require deferral of at least 50% of the annual incentive-based 
compensation awarded for a period of not less than three years.161 That may or may not 
be adequate, but the real surprise in these regulations is that, in the case of those persons 
specifically identified by the TBTF institution’s board as being capable of exposing the 
institution to “substantial loss,” no deferral was required. Instead, all that was mandated 
was that the board or committee must approve the incentive-based compensation 
arrangements for such persons and further determine “that the arrangement . . . 
effectively balances the financial rewards to the covered person and the range and time 
horizon of risks associated with the covered persons activities, employing appropriate 
methods for ensuring risk sensitivity, such as deferral of payments . . .”162 In short, the 
only requirement for even those persons identified by the firm as being capable of 
causing it “substantial losses” is that the board or committee think seriously about 
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deferral or some other means of ensuring “risk sensitivity.” 
 The proposed rules thus fall breathtakingly short of adequacy on two major 
grounds:  (1) they wholly delegate to the firm the decision of who could cause it 
“substantial loss,” and (2) even with respect to the persons so identified, the rules require 
only process and no minimum deferral. 
 Why have financial regulators, in common, pulled their punches by (1) requiring 
little specific data, (2) allowing the firms to alone decide who (besides executive officers) 
can cause them significant loss, and (3) not even requiring some deferral of bonuses by 
the persons so identified? The most plausible answer is that regulators knew that a more 
effective rule might provoke significant employee defections, as “star” traders (and 
others) moved from investment banks to less regulated trading firms. Realistically, the 
non-executive officer most likely to be able to cause a substantial loss to a “covered 
financial institution” is a trader who is authorized to trade on a large position basis. Such 
traders have in recent memory caused staggering losses to some financial institutions 
(remember Nicholas Leeson at Barings and Jerome Kervais at Societe Generale).163  
 Although it is likely that most covered firms will report some employees who can 
cause it substantial losses, the number so reported will be likely far below the number 
that would be disclosed if more objective criteria were used. Underreporting the number 
of such persons has several attractions:  (1) it makes the firm appear safer in general; (2) 
it spares the board (or committee) the obligation to engage in additional specific 
assessments of whether adequate risk sensitivity has been structured into each such 
person’s incentive compensation; and (3) it ensures that the persons who otherwise would 
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be identified as being capable of causing “substantial loss” to the firm will not be 
restricted in their compensation by the appropriate regulatory agency. That is, despite the 
board or committee’s findings, the relevant regulator might still determine that there was 
inadequate risk sensitivity and thus that the compensation was excessive. However, if the 
“star” personnel are never so identified, this problem simply does not arise. 
 To summarize, the problem for the TBTF financial institution was that if highly 
compensated “stars” were subjected to the same deferral of incentive compensation as are 
executive officers, they might flee “covered financial institutions” to relocate at hedge 
funds, smaller banks, or go abroad to escape such controls. Fearing such migration, 
financial institutions probably lobbied for a weaker rule (and appear to have succeeded). 
Still, the irony is that few vice presidents at a financial institution can cause the same 
injury to it as can a star trader (such as such celebrated rogue traders as Jerome Kervais 
or Nicholas Leeson).164 The choice for financial regulators was between an effective rule 
and some competitive injury to the TBTF banks. The latter consideration appears to have 
dominated, and that pattern may recur regularly as the implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act continues. 
 Executive compensation was the leading topic on which Congress (pushed by 
taxpayers) showed real anger. Still, once the negotiations moved from Congress to the 
regulatory agencies, that anger dissipated or at least yielded to concerns about employee 
defections and competitive injury. That could happen even more easily in other areas 
where the public anger was less intense.  
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 B. The TBTF Problem. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress sought to address the 
TBTF bank in several ways:  (1) providing for “resolution authority” to quickly liquidate 
a failed bank without the interminable process of a bankruptcy proceeding;165 (2) 
reducing the risk level of banks, including by means of the Volcker Rule;166 and (3) 
authorizing stricter prudential standards, including the use of a contingent capital 
standard.167 As we have earlier seen with respect to SOX’s prohibition of executive loans 
and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act’s equivocal executive compensation rules, even 
clear Congressional statements can be enervated through administrative interpretation 
and underenforcement. Yet, in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act’s approach to TBTF 
institutions, the legislation never articulated clear standards to begin with, and equivocal 
implementation will likely weaken these standards further. 
 1. Resolution Authority. The fact that financial regulators, acting in virtual 
unison, can liquidate a TBTF institution before it becomes legally insolvent does not 
mean that they will actually do so. Such action would imply a black eye for almost any 
Administration, suggesting that it had been a poor financial watchdog. Regulators might 
also fear that such action would trigger a financial panic. The temptation for regulators is 
thus “to kick the can down the road,” hoping for the best and seeing little advantage in 
early intervention. Moreover, as the financial industry has grown more concentrated in 
the wake of the 2008 failures and consequent mergers, the remaining TBTF banks are 
even larger. Thus, any failure of one of them would be more serious. For all these 
reasons, the TBTF banks have increased incentives to maintain large lobbying cadres in 
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Washington to protect their interests from adverse actions (which could never occur 
quickly in any event, because it would require high coordination and unanimity among 
regulators). 
 Still, suppose a TBTF bank does fail? At this point, the FDIC may be able to 
provide financing to a bridge company that acquires most of its assets. It could either 
decide to bail out the bondholders or to let them share in the pain in order to end the 
TBTF subsidy. The highly discretionary character of this choice suggests it too will invite 
heavy lobbying. In turn, the more that bondholders are in fact paid off from an FDIC fund 
(and the FDIC can borrow from the FRB for this purpose), the more that the TBTF 
subsidy survives. Ultimately, one cannot predict what will happen in any specific case, 
but the greater the fear of a financial panic, the more financial regulators are likely to 
want to cause bondholders to be paid in full to avert panic. Little may change, and the 
TBTF subsidy may persist. 
 2.  The Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule is a coherent response to the TBTF 
problem:  that is, if banks are too big to fail, they must be regulated so that their risk-
taking is constrained in order that they do not fail. But the Volcker Rule faces political 
problems. First, there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for 
the failure (or near failure) of any financial institution in the 2008 crisis. In contrast, firms 
like Lehman failed because of their principal investments:  Lehman made disastrous 
acquisitions of major real estate lenders and developers (including SunCal and 
Archstone), but those acquisitions, which made it undiversified and overleveraged, fell 
well outside the definition of proprietary trading in the Dodd-Frank Act. In this respect, 
the Volcker Rule is seriously underinclusive because it exempts principal investments 
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from its ban, despite the Lehman experience.  
 Second, Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which expresses the Volcker Rule, 
contains numerous loopholes and exceptions.168 Chief among these are exceptions for 
hedging and market making by the covered financial institution. The financial regulators 
have recently released their proposed draft of the Volcker Rule.169 On a preliminary 
review, it seems potentially tougher and more restrictive than many had expected. Still, 
the start of the process is not the end of the process, and opposition to it is mounting.170 
Always opportunistic, the financial services industry has seized on the crisis in European 
sovereign debt to warn that the Volcker Rule’s implementation will curtail the demand 
for European sovereign debt and aggravate that crisis.171 Here again, the experience with 
SOX may be repeated, with the proposed rules on proprietary trading being watered 
down. 
 3.  Contingent Capital. One of the most original ideas proposed to avert TBTF 
debacles is a requirement that some portion of the financial institution’s debt securities be 
required, in the original bond contract, to convert into an equity security if the financial 
                                                 
168
 See Section 619(d)(1). These include: (1) underwriting and market-making related activities, 
(2) risk-mitigating hedging activities; (3) investments driven by customer demand; (4) proprietary 
trading done outside the United States, and (5) such other activities as regulators determine by 
rule would promote safety and soundness of the banking system. 
169
 On October 12, 2011, the SEC voted to propose a version of the Volcker Rule that was drafted 
in common with other financial regulators. See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/ 2011-
204.htm. A proposed release has not yet been issued, but a final rule must be adopted in 2012. 
170
 See James Stewart, “Volcker Rule: Once Simple, Now Boggles,” the N.Y. Times, October 22, 
2011 at B-1, see also Editorial, “So Much for the Volcker Rule,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 24, 2011 at A-13 (noting that the 298 page proposed rule contains some “1,347 queries” 
that must be considered before a final rule is adopted). 
171
 See Brooke Masters and David Oakley, “Bankers in Eurozone Warning,” The Financial 
Times, November 22, 2011 at p. 15. See also text and note infra at note 188 (two partners at 
Davis Polk predict that proposed regulation implementing Volcker Rule will be withdrawn). 
-75- 
 
institution begins to approach insolvency.172 Although the original idea was to convert 
the debt to equity on the doorsteps of insolvency, much more can be done with this 
flexible idea. Uniquely, it provides an ex ante tool. As the stock price of the institution 
declines, debt could convert at several stages on an incremental basis into an equity 
security, thereby diluting the equity and punishing the stockholders for their pursuit of 
higher leverage and risk-taking. Used this way, the tool has a prospective deterrent 
power. This author has proposed conversion of the debt into a voting preferred stock, 
whose holders would have incentives naturally aligned with other debt holders and 
adverse to the common stockholders.173 The goal is again to create a counterbalancing 
constituency that would resist shareholder pressure. 
 Other innovative designs are possible, but the likelihood is high that the Federal 
Reserve will ignore all these possibilities. Instead, it will likely propose that contingent 
capital be used only as a form of prepackaged bankruptcy. If insolvency has become 
inevitable, even the financial industry recognizes that it would be quicker and simpler to 
convert much of the debt into equity than utilize the cumbersome procedures of 
resolution authority. The banking community would probably also prefer such a modest 
use of contingent capital because it reduces the uncertainty incident to a liquidation and 
avoids the mandatory ouster of responsible management that is required under 
“resolution authority.” 
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 While this technique for averting bankruptcy can be traced back for a considerable period, the 
author most responsible for its consideration in the context of a TBTF institution is Professor 
Mark J. Flannery. See Mark J. Flannery, “No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline Via 
Reverse Convertible Debentures” in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL:  Banking, 
Securities and Insurance 171 (Hal Scott ed., 2005). See also Coffee, supra note 126, (reviewing 
possible designs for the use of contingent capital). 
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 See Coffee, supra note 126, at 805-807, 828-834. 
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 Still, such a minimal use of contingent capital is myopic. It surrenders the 
possibility of ex ante measures that could precede and avert insolvency. But if anything 
can be safely predicted, it is that the Federal Reserve is too closely imbedded within the 
banking community to propose any intrusive remedy that would be invoked well before a 
banking crisis has begun. 
 C.  The Legislative Counterattack. As of early 2012, legislation is pending that 
would severely curtail many of the corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.174 Essentially, the legislation would create a new category of issuer called an 
“emerging growth company,” which would be exempt from many of the provisions of the 
proxy rules, including the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions as “say on pay” and related 
compensation disclosures, as well as Section 404(b) of SOX.175 The term “emerging 
growth company” is broadly defined to include any issuer that has annual gross revenues 
of less than $1 billion and that has a public float of less than $700 million.176 The 
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 The most relevant bill (and there are several) is the “Reopening American Capital Markets to 
Emerging Growth Companies,” which is H.R. 3606 in the House and S.1933 in the Senate. For a 
brief description of this legislation, see “IPO ‘On-Ramp’; Initial Public Offerings,” Mondaq 
Business Briefing, December 27, 2011. 
175
 S.1933 and H.R. 3606 would each amend Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to define the term “emerging growth 
company.” So long as currently private companies remained “emerging growth companies,” these 
issuers would be exempt from Section 14A (“Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Compensation”), which mandates a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation not less 
frequently than once every three years. Disclosure of the median of the annual total compensation 
of all employees, which was mandated by Section 953(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, would also 
be waived for “emerging growth companies” (as would compliance with Section 404(b) of SOX). 
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 S.1933 and H.R.3606 require both that the issuer have less than $1 billion in gross revenues 
for its last fiscal year and that the issuer not have common stock held by non-affiliates with a 
market value of $700 million or more. This market value standard, known as the “public float,” 
was adopted by the SEC to define a “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer,” which is entitled to use 
automatic shelf registration. See Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. 230.405. Thus, companies with a relatively 
large public ownership would still qualify as “emerging growth companies” and escape the Dodd-
Frank Act’s corporate governance provisions. 
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rationale for this broad exemption is that it would spur job creation by encouraging 
smaller companies to conduct initial public offerings. This rationale is doubtful, because 
the decline in IPOs, while real, dates back at least to the burst of the Internet IPO bubble 
in 2001 and thus could hardly have been caused by either the Dodd-Frank Act or SOX’s 
Section 404. Many other factors better explain the decline in IPOs than any increase in 
regulatory costs after 2001.177  
 Still, such proposals chiefly demonstrate the continuing impact of the Regulatory 
Sine Curve. In 2011, financial industry representatives formed an industry study group, 
which called itself the “IPO Task Force,” and it quickly prepared a report attributing the 
decline in IPOs to regulatory and market structure changes.178 Entirely ignored by this 
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 No dispute exists that the number of IPOs declined significantly after 2000. This number 
appears to have peaked at 791 IPOs in 1996 and then fallen to an average of 157 IPOs from 2001 
to 2008, with a low of 45 in the financial crisis year of 2008. See IPO Task Force, Rebuilding the 
IPO On-Ramp, Presented to the U.S. Treasury (Oct. 20, 2011) (hereinafter, “IPO Task Force 
Report”). But what caused this decline? Industry groups cite costly regulation, but the impact of 
SOX’s Section 404(b) was not felt until 2004 when Accounting Standard No. 2 was adopted by 
the PCAOB (see text and note supra at note 61), and the Dodd-Frank Act’s rules have still not 
become effective. Thus, the legal environment of the 1990s, when IPOs peaked, was similar to 
that in the post-2000 decade, when they declined. Better explanations involve:  (1) the loss of 
investor confidence in IPOs after the Internet bubble burst in 2000 and severe conflicts of interest 
involving securities analysts were exposed by Eliot Spitzer and others; (2) the “de-retailization of 
the market,” as individual investors have left the market and institutional investors are less 
dependent on sell-side analysts; (3) the loss of interest by institutional investors in smaller IPOs, 
which cannot provide them with sufficient market depth to assure liquidity; and (4) the high fixed 
costs of smaller IPOs, which make it more cost efficient for smaller companies to raise capital in 
the private placement market. For a discussion of some of these explanations, see Testimony of 
John Coates, Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, Senate Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Hearing on 
“Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising,” December 14, 2011 (available on LEXIS). 
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 See IPO Task Force Report. For a more affirmative discussion of this report by its chairman, 
see Testimony of Kate Mitchell before House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises Hearing on “Reopening American Capital 
Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011” on December 15, 2011 (available on 
LEXIS). Her testimony does not focus on any of the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act as a 
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report was the likely loss in investor confidence following the burst of the Internet stock 
bubble. The IPO Task Force proposed to remedy the decline in IPOs by dismantling 
many of the regulatory changes that were adopted following the 2001 market crash.179 
 Time and again, this is the key move:  to blame economic stagnation and job loss, 
not on a crash or a bubble, but on the regulation that follows it. The legislation proposed 
by the IPO Task Force has broad bipartisan support and is one of several deregulatory 
proposals that seem likely to pass Congress as part of a job creation program.180 Although 
it will likely accomplish little in terms of reversing the decline in initial public offerings, 
this legislation will ease constraints imposed on the financial services industry. Above all, 
this episode shows again that, once a crisis has passed, Congress can easily be persuaded 
                                                                                                                                                 
significant barrier to an IPO, but does identify SOX’s Section 404(b) as the most costly barrier to 
becoming a public company. Still, if so, this diagnosis hardly leads to a prescription of rolling 
back the Dodd-Frank Act. 
179
 In particular, the IPO Task Force Report would override the existing rules of FINRA and 
permit securities analysts associated with an underwriter who is participating in the offering to 
issue reports on the issuer at the time of the offering. Today, FINRA Rule 2711 precludes a 
managing underwriter from distributing a research report about an issuer client until 40 days after 
the registration statement becomes effective (and other underwriters in the offering are similarly 
precluded for 25 days). This was a rule adopted by an industry self-regulatory body, not 
Congress, and these rules were adopted in response to the 2000-2002 controversy involving 
Internet securities analysts, most notably Henry Blodgett and Jack Grubman, who became iconic 
examples of conflicted securities analysts as a result of enforcement actions undertaken by then 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Nonetheless, the IPO Task Force displays a collective 
amnesia about these conflicts, and Congress appears unable to resist the seductive argument that 
deregulation means job creation. 
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 A number of bills are pending and seem likely to pass in 2012 that would enable smaller 
companies to avoid either or both of the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 or 
the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For detailed reviews of them, 
see Coates, supra note 177 and Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A Berle Professor of 
Law, Columbia University Law School, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, on “Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors,” 
December, 2011. It is not the contention of this article that these bills undermine the federal 
securities laws, but only that they show a recurrent pattern of thinking that considers only the 
costs of regulation and not the cost of crashes and bubbles. Absent restored investor confidence or 
major technological breakthroughs, there is little prospect of an upsurge in the number of IPOs.  
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to repeal legislation that it passed in response to the crisis. This does not prove that the 
original legislation was flawed, but only that Congress can be manipulated and, absent 
some countervailing force, has a limited attention span and will sometimes accept 
makeweight arguments. To be sure, in a national crisis, countervailing forces sometimes 
arise, but they do not remain organized and vigilant indefinitely – hence, the regulatory 
sine curve persists.  
CONCLUSION 
 The key and recurring debate over financial reform is between those who distrust 
both legislation and regulation (a position that the Tea Party Caucus exemplifies) and 
those who believe strong regulation is necessary to restrain systemic risk. In this debate, 
the standard move of those who distrust regulation is to attribute economic stagnation and 
job loss to costly regulation, ignoring that the costs of market bubbles and crashes dwarf 
those of regulation. Their ability to do this (and frankly with some success) is evidence of 
a collective social amnesia that appears to overtake Congress and others, as soon as the 
crisis fades from the headlines. This recurrent amnesia is in turn the product of what this 
article has termed the Regulatory Sine Curve – a cycle that is driven by the differential in 
resources, organization, and lobbying capacity that favors those interests determined to 
resist further regulation.181 
 Without doubt, some regulation is foolish and overbroad, but the point 
emphasized by this article is that such overbroad regulation is usually repealed or 
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 This disparity will only grow in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (First Amendment protects independent expenditures in support of a political 
candidate from governmental regulation limiting such contributions). For the finding that 
corporate political and lobbying expenditures are increasing in the wake of this decision, see John 
C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance and Value Before and After Citizens United, 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975421) (December 22, 2011). 
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curtailed relatively quickly (and without the need for mandatory sunsets). The greater 
danger is that the forces of inertia will veto or block all change. The pervasive 
underregulation of “shadow banking,” which has continued for decades, appears to have 
been a leading cause of the 2008 financial debacle and the current economic stagnation. 
Failing meaningful implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, financial executives may 
once again race like lemmings over the financial cliffs by taking on leverage that they 
cannot sustain. One cannot pretend to predict when this will occur, but driving this 
process will be the same perverse incentives:  basically, short-term executive 
compensation and market pressure for higher leverage and greater risk-taking. These root 
causes will again be aided and abetted by equivocal regulation and bounded rationality. 
 In short, history repeats itself, particularly when it is ignored. In truth, the Dodd-
Frank Act potentially faces even greater downsizing than SOX has experienced. This is 
because its effective implementation requires greater regulatory encroachment into the 
core business decisions of financial institutions over their capital adequacy, leverage, and 
compensation. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act seems destined to be resisted even more 
aggressively than SOX was. If, however, the Dodd-Frank Act is similarly neutralized by 
a combination of equivocal rule-making and legal challenges, the consequences may be 
far more ominous. Systemic risk poses a far greater threat to both the United States and 
the world’s economy than did the corporate governance failures and accounting 
irregularities to which SOX responded. 
 It is not the contention of this article that sustained reform is impossible or that, in 
response to a crisis, regulatory agencies are only capable of “rearranging the deck chairs 
on the Titanic.” That would overstate. Indeed, political entrepreneurs who unite and 
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sustain a political coalition of investors and enable them to resist better-funded special 
interest groups would be the heroes of this story – if only such actors were more 
visible.182 In the absence of such leaders, the first and reflexive response of many 
regulatory agencies after a crash is simply to move the deck chairs around in a 
sufficiently noisy fashion to show that they are on the job. Some evidence suggests that is 
again happening.183 Beyond this lack of imagination and political nerve, the greater 
problem is that financial regulators are often so closely intertwined with those that they 
regulate that they respond in an equivocal and even timid fashion.184 The recent and joint 
rules on executive compensation adopted by the principal federal financial regulators 
exemplify this problem because the limited reach of these rules seems motivated more by 
a desire to protect the industry from competition than to control moral hazard. 
 What could be done to compensate for the predictable tendency toward rapid 
erosion of reform legislation? Arguably, one could advocate the use of stronger 
prophylactic rules in the original reform legislation with less delegation to administrative 
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 As earlier suggested (see supra at note 8), Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo have at times 
played the “public entrepreneur” role, but the SEC has been far more cautious and bureaucratic. 
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 An excellent example is the SEC’s latest release containing proposed rules for credit rating 
agencies. See SEC Release No. 34-64514 (“Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical 
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reputational consequences of a litigation defeat, or budgetary constraints that limit the agency’s 
ability to engage in aggressive enforcement. No attempt is here made to disentangle the various 
causes. Finally, fear of judicial reversal may also cause the regulator to trim its sails and propose 
only equivocal rules. 
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agencies.185 Such a proposal would be the polar opposite of Professor Romano’s 
mandatory sunset rule. Although such a shift would be logical, this article still stops short 
of making any across-the-board such recommendation because it would entail 
undesirable rigidity. A second best substitute may be to use market-based reforms that 
use objective market tests and thus depend less on administrative implementation.186 
While disclosure is always a useful remedy, it needs to be refocused. Hopefully, the 
financial press might be persuaded to focus more on weak or equivocal administrative 
implementation. Some courts may also embarrass the SEC into stronger enforcement 
action.187 It is premature, however, to evaluate these options until the implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act is further along. 
 “Capture” is an overused and underdefined term. This article does not assert that 
financial regulators have been captured, but does conclude that they are far better at 
prosecuting outliers and crooks than in controlling reckless ambition by those at the top 
of the corporate hierarchy. To be sure, some desirable reforms will emerge from the 
Dodd-Frank Act that will reduce the risk (marginally at least) of another systemic risk 
crisis for the immediate future. Predictably, capital adequacy standards will be raised and 
leverage ratios marginally restricted at TBTF institutions. But the pursuit of higher 
leverage has not yet been checked. The acid test for meaningful reform is likely to lie in 
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 The Securities Exchange Act does contain several such prophylactic rules. For example, 
Section 16(b) of that Act broadly prohibits “short swing” trading without any need to prove 
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the outcomes in three areas:  (1) the implementation of the Volcker Rule,188 (2) the fate of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s preference for trading OTC derivatives through exchanges and 
clearinghouses, and (3) the strength of the capital adequacy rules for TBTF banks.189 In 
each case, the exceptions may overwhelm the rule.  
 Across all the financial regulatory agencies, the deep seated preference is to 
depend upon bureaucratic oversight and monitoring in preference to more prophylactic 
rules. But, as prior market crashes have shown, the same cognitive limitations that blind 
market participants also cloud the vision of regulators. More objective, market-based 
tests are possible and desirable,190 but they have no constituency supporting them. As a 
result, the same regulators who missed the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in 
1998, the IPO Bubble in 2000, the Enron and WorldCom failures in 2001-2002, the 
market timing scandal in mutual funds in 2004, Bernie Madoff in 2008 and the Lehman 
and AIG collapses in 2008 seem likely in time to do it again. Bounded rationality 
compounded by the Regulatory Sine Curve implies that eventually we will face another 
systemic risk crisis.  
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